

THE LIVING AGE



CONTENTS *for July 15, 1930*

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THE LIVING AGE was established by E. Littell, in Boston, Massachusetts, May, 1844. It was first known as LITTELL'S LIVING AGE succeeding *Littell's Museum of Foreign Literature*, which had been previously published in Philadelphia for more than twenty years. In a prepublication announcement of LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, in 1844, Mr. Littell said: "The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections as Merchants, Travelers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world: so that much more than ever, it now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries."

THE GUIDE POST

AS ONE READS the signs in Europe, it becomes increasingly apparent that the single problem most embarrassing to those who desire European political stability is the controversy between France and Italy; for everyone seems agreed that the problems of general peace in the Old World cannot be settled unless France and Italy are in accord. Just why the two Latin nations are arching their backs and spitting at each other is outlined in this issue with grateful clarity by an English correspondent, in *ITALY VERSUS FRANCE*.

THERE are plenty of Empire builders in the British Foreign Office, but, thanks to birth control, there are increasingly few in the British home. This, in rough terms, is the thesis set forth in *EMPIRE AND POPULATION* by SIR LEO CHIOZZA MONEY, the British publicist and statesman who had so much to do with Britain's maritime policies during the War. He quietly opens up what is to us, at least, a new and interesting approach to the population problems of a good part of the white race, and makes a point the neglect of which has led many a statesman into errors that cost the whole world blood.

TWO articles in this issue—*GERMANY IN CHAINS*, by two Germans in Prague, and *GERMANY SET FREE*, by a French political observer—indicate such a wide divergence of opinion and point of view that it hardly seems possible that the same country is under discussion in each. The interest lies, therefore, not so much in the absolute truth of either view, but in the significance of both views as representative of the political attitudes of two former enemy peoples. HERR WANNENMACHER and HERR KELLER, writing in the *Prager Tagblatt*, express the German's dull anger against the forces which he rightly or wrongly believes responsible for his poverty—a gnawing pessimism and

dissatisfaction which are likely to turn him into a difficult friend, if friend at all. M. LAFUE, on the other hand, in *GERMANY SET FREE*, paints with unhesitant, sweeping strokes—a little too sweeping to be entirely accurate—the realignment of European powers which he believes will shortly bring the German end of the seesaw up again. Whether he is right or not, his article indicates clearly once again how anxiously France is watching to see which way the Italian cat is going to jump.

THE recurrence of this theme of Franco-Italian differences is significant; and it offers a clear example of what often makes us wish that we could give our readers more material relevant to a single question in one number of *THE LIVING AGE*—perhaps, as has frequently been suggested, by increasing the bulk of the magazine and adopting a monthly publication date. If, for instance, we could have set any one of several articles now before us, which must be postponed until future issues for reasons of space, side by side in this issue with *ITALY VERSUS FRANCE* and *GERMANY SET FREE*, a sharper and better illuminated picture of this central problem of European politics would have emerged.

BERTA ZUCKERKANDL-SZEPS'S article, *VISITING THE SNOWDENS*, is about as unusual a view of home life among the Socialists as one is likely to find—unusual enough, in fact, to explain the statement, published elsewhere in this issue, of a subscriber who says that if he had to confine himself to only one magazine it would be *THE LIVING AGE*. The author is an Austrian friend of Mrs. Snowden, wife of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. Perhaps the most entertaining feature of her account of a week's visit in Downing Street is the fact that a lady familiar with the Viennese, who have cast the gray
(Continued on page 627)

THE LIVING AGE

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In 1844



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The World Over

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW of European opinion the new American tariff cannot be looked upon as anything but a first-class disaster. Every foreign country with a grievance against the United States has seized this opportunity to air its bitterness and the press of the Continent has been fanning the fires of its honest rage with long suppressed gusts of jealousy. Public demonstrations have been held in Switzerland by indignant manufacturers of clocks and cheese, while the larger industries of France and Germany have offered more serious protests. Only the British press has remained comparatively calm. It has confined itself to pointing out that the Americans are really cutting their own throats—a spectacle not calculated to bring tears to British eyes—and certain cynical free traders are prophesying that the disastrous results of America's high tariffs will save the British from learning for themselves the costly fallacy of protection. Nor is such a view so extreme as it sounds. Protection has now become the logical policy for small nations to follow, since it insures their industries against dumping and helps them to plan their future output with some degree of security. But this line of reasoning is hardly flattering to national pride and it is therefore surprising that some of the most arrogant Conservatives in Great Britain resort to it, thereby virtually admitting that their country can no longer compete equally in the markets of the world. In other words, demands for protection at home indicate a confession of weakness abroad. No wonder, then, that the British find it hard to attack

their chief competitor for having made such an unaccountable declaration and for having thereby earned the ill-will of its best customers. Here, for instance, is the entirely solicitous comment of the *Manchester Guardian*:—

The Tariff Bill has probably done more to discredit Mr. Hoover's Administration than anything else. He was returned on the prosperity issue. A year ago he was regarded as the only reliable guardian of an unfailing horn of abundance. Since then his reputation has been slowly declining. When he came to the White House he was warned that a crash was imminent. Yet he did nothing. And here again, on the question of the tariff, he has never taken any courageous and consistent attitude of opposition. Congress has been left to its own wayward devices, while having an uncomfortable feeling that the President secretly disapproved of its wildest excesses. Mr. Hoover is far too good an economist not to know that trade is a matter of exchange, and that by refusing to take other people's goods America prevents them from buying from her. What has she to gain from so impoverishing her neighbors at a time when we are all suffering from a world slump?

The *Daily Telegraph*, a paper of quite different political views, takes just the same attitude:—

Some forty foreign governments, including our own and those of Canada and Australia, have, while this legislation was taking shape, made strong representation in Washington of the injury which must be inflicted on their trade by the new schedules. The feeling that fiscal reprisals are a certainty and the knowledge of their being already on foot in Canada and elsewhere have aroused the gravest misgiving in a community to which the preservation and improvement of its place in foreign markets is to-day vital. The enormous automobile industry of America is, for example, confessedly dreading the effects of the new tariff; and exporting industry in general, noting the marked decline already shown from the figures of a year ago, has no desire to see the position artificially made worse. The truth was lately put with homely good sense by the president of the General Motors Export Company. 'You cannot,' he said, 'ship out of the country a terrific amount of goods without getting goods back to pay for them.' These are considerations understood by Mr. Hoover better than by most people, and it can be no agreeable decision for him to give the force of law to a measure opposed to the first principles of sound fiscal policy.

We shall have to wait until our next issue to give more detailed and considered foreign articles on this important subject, and we append here only one Continental comment, written by André Chaumeix, successor to Clemenceau in the French Academy. Its spirit is reflected by countless similar outbursts in all parts of the Continent:—

Europe, for her part, will soon feel the results of the American decision, which is a matter of small importance to the United States since it feels so strong and so rich. Since the Versailles Treaty was signed we have seen the Americans remaining obstinately faithful to a method that they try to apply everywhere. Under all circumstances the United States endeavors to expand its ideas and products throughout Europe but does not wish to receive any-

thing in return. Glad to influence Europe, it has no desire to undergo any foreign influences in exchange. Old Europe, reading over her history, will find, in her past, examples of ancient discipline that cost a certain price and lessons quite different from those that America teaches us, but lessons that still possess moral and political value.

'SEVEN OF GOD'S ENGLISHMEN'—in these apt words Stanley Baldwin described the members of the Simon Commission whose report on India has met with such a mixed reception. Yet how these men could have arrived at a different decision and still have deserved Mr. Baldwin's tribute is a little difficult to understand. For the past two and a half years two Labor members of Parliament and four leading Conservatives, headed by Sir John Simon, a Liberal M.P., have been traveling the length and breadth of India, covering 20,000 miles and pondering upon what they saw, preparatory to writing their recommendations. After surveying the field with a mastery that won universal respect, they all agreed to advocate a gradual development toward self-rule within the Empire, saying nothing about dominion status and urging the immediate establishment of a more powerful central authority than exists to-day. The members of the Commission, having seen for themselves an almost wholly illiterate subcontinent as large as the United States and populated by nearly three times as many inhabitants who speak 222 different vernaculars and live in a constant condition of religious hatred, could not bring themselves to permit these unfortunates to pursue their own destiny without British assistance. Here, for instance, is the way the *Manchester Guardian* describes the problem:—

Let us try to see what are the governing factors in the situation. Surely the chief of them is the Indian cultivator. For some 90 per cent of the population of India live in the villages, and they live on his labor. He is the typical Indian citizen. It is of him and for him that the Indian state of to-morrow must in the main be built. Now the typical Indian cultivator has a holding of about five acres, consisting usually of numerous unfenced fields scattered here and there among the fields of his neighbors. The country is densely populated. There is no fresh land available for him. His agricultural operations can only be carried on at certain seasons. Half his time he is unemployed. He is illiterate and usually in debt to the nearest money lender. He is the chief producer of India, yet his production leaves little to spare after his family has been fed, and the taxes must ultimately come out of production. How is his product to support an expensive system of administration or to find the immense sums required to give India efficient education and efficient sanitation?

Efficient education and efficient sanitation having been the admitted ideals of Britain in India, the British Civil Service was naturally called into play. But in attempting to fulfill its duties it created a strange complication:—

The régime of the British civil servant gave an opportunity for the rise of a new Indian aristocracy, the professional class. This class has, and it feels that it has, a natural right to be the governing class in India. The friction developed by its ambitions has been so great as to destroy the efficiency of the old régime. This natural ambition is 'nationalism,' and it is as much a governing factor in the situation as the poverty of the Indian villager.

The *Guardian* therefore ends with this hopeful recommendation:—

Thus the future government of India must be constructed with an eye on the needs and limitations of the Indian peasant, but it must be so contrived as to make full use of the energies of India's professional classes and to give them not only a sense of their responsibility to the peasant but also a pride in their work and a feeling that their position is in no way inconsistent with the dignity of representatives of a great and ancient civilization.

The Conservative *Morning Post* has no use for such vague remedies. In a leading editorial entitled 'Unhappiness as a Goal' it argues that any measure which does not strengthen Britain's present hold will not only work against British interests but will damage the poor natives, too. By way of reply to any critics who are so rash as to assert that independence represents the greatest happiness as well as the greatest desire of the greatest number, the *Post* has this to say:—

It may be said that we have only to consider the happiness of the greatest number, and that minorities must suffer; so that, the Hindus being in a majority over all, the Mohammedans must reconcile themselves to their fate. But this argument does not survive an analysis of the Hindu population, of whom a small minority have contrived to capture political power. Some 30 per cent of the Hindus, or forty millions, are what are called 'Untouchables'; they are, in many parts, not allowed to enter the schools, or even to walk on the public roads, or draw water from the public wells by day. These people are no less afraid of a Hindu government than the Mohammedans, since they fear it would rivet the chains of caste ascendancy upon their necks. Then there are the Indian Christians, about four and a half million souls in all, who would probably be exterminated if British protection were withdrawn. And what shall we say of the Anglo-Indian community, which numbers over one hundred thousand? The British are directly responsible for these people, who are naturally and cruelly alarmed by the tendency to withdraw our rule from India.

The editorial finally arrives at this gloomy conclusion: 'And so it really comes to this, that we must make way for the goal—"gradually" or otherwise—of the greatest unhappiness of the greatest number, and, in addition, the greatest insecurity for everything British in India.'

At the opposite extreme of articulate British opinion—for the Indians are almost incoherent with bitterness on the subject—stands the *New Leader*, organ of the Independent Labor Party to which the left-wing group of Laborites belongs. This paper is not entirely satisfied with the Commission's findings and a member of Parliament who rejoices in the name of A. Fenner Brockway and who has devoted years of first-hand study to Indian affairs offers seven points of his own

to replace the Commission's recommendations. Here is Mr. Brockway's private report, which expresses the views of a considerable section of the Labor Party and outlines his ideas of what the Round-Table Conference, which will decide the Indian problem this autumn on the basis of the Simon Report, should attempt:—

(1) Fully responsible government should be accepted as the basis of the Round-Table Conference.

(2) The Conference should be asked to prepare a Constitution automatically advancing to complete self-government, to define the transitional period from the present to the new régime, and to decide the arrangements during this period for the Indianization of the Civil Service and the Forces.

(3) It should be recognized that at the end of this transitional period the Indian Government should have the right to decide whether India should remain within the Empire. (The Dominions already possess a similar right.)

(4) The Indian delegates to the Round-Table Conference should be elected by an all-in assembly of Indian organizations, with due recognition of the fact that the Indian National Congress is the most representative body.

(5) An amnesty should be granted to all political offenders, except those actually guilty of acts of violence. The war-time 'rebels' of 1915 should be released and the martial-law prisoners of 1919, and the exiles allowed to return to India without threat of prosecution.

(6) Immediate steps should be taken to deal with the most acute Indian grievances—the salt tax, the liquor revenue, and the currency.

(7) An educational campaign, with the provision of material, should be conducted throughout India to teach the peasants hand-weaving and spinning. (This would be a splendid gesture to Gandhi, and would be of immense value to the poverty-stricken peasants, much of whose time is spent in idleness.)

THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS missed a great opportunity when they refused to discuss disarmament at their annual convention held this year in Bordeaux. Although their party has been picking up votes from Communists to the left and from Radicals to the right and although in twelve by-elections held since last March the Socialists have won six seats formerly occupied by Radicals, the Socialist leaders have not dared to bring Léon Blum's policy of 'disarmament by example' into the open. Blum himself, the head of the party and the editor of its official organ, the *Populaire*, is so determined to maintain unity at all costs that he feared to advance his plan at a moment when war fever in Europe has begun to run a little higher than normal. This attitude of compromise fits him especially badly because his party owes its great moral prestige to its consistent refusal to coöperate with any other group. The day before the convention opened, Herriot made a public appeal to the Socialists, begging them, in the name of his own Radical followers, to show a greater willingness to coöperate and to recognize that the parties of the right would remain in power just as long as the parties of the left remained divided.

BY SANCTIONING a wage cut of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent that affects some 200,000 German workers in the northwestern metal industries, Herr Stegerwald, Minister of Labor in the Brüning Cabinet and a former trade unionist, has made a decisive step toward cheaper production. Originally the employers had demanded a 10 per cent reduction, but the arbitration board whose decision the Government has approved reduced this to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. With world conditions resembling more and more the painful state into which rationalization and overproduction have plunged Germany, this cut is likely to be followed by others and Germany seems to be in a fair way toward stealing a march on the rest of the world by persuading her laboring classes to work for less money and giving them more to do.

In any event, the quick response aroused in England shows what far-reaching results this measure may produce. The *Daily Telegraph* featured the news of the cut the moment it was made public and two days later gave equal prominence to a letter sent to all British consular offices throughout the world and signed by the Master Cutler at Sheffield and the President of the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce. Here are some outstanding paragraphs which indicate that Britain's industrial position is by no means so desperate as she would like to have her competitors believe:—

It is frequently stated that Sheffield is at the present time not working to full capacity, and it is argued therefrom that she is on the downward grade. The fact is that Sheffield to-day is actually turning out annually 50 per cent more steel and steel products than she did even in the very best of her pre-War years. And the only reason why she is not working to her present full capacity at the present time is because her capacity for output was trebled during the War period.

Sheffield is actually employing now many thousand more hands than she did before the War. This feat is all the more astounding from the fact that Sheffield has lost almost entirely one of her two staple pre-War industries, heavy and other armament work.

The fact is that Sheffield steels to-day are not only vastly better than they have ever been, but are much farther ahead to-day of the rest of the world than at any previous time. It is difficult to establish this position in detail without going into metallurgical technicalities, but it is proved beyond contention by the mere fact that Sheffield to-day is supplying competing steel-producing countries with many of her special steels, even when such countries are protected by tariffs that are regarded as prohibitive.

PARADOXICAL as it may seem, Germany's present conservative government has done much more to promote friendship with Russia than the Socialists ever did when they were in power. The recent determination of Moscow and Berlin to pursue a policy of coöperation

means that the big German industrialists are cultivating the Russian Communists in the hope of preventing their employees from joining the powerful Socialist movement to which the Third International is unalterably opposed. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Curtius also has a hand in Germany's new departure. Unlike his predecessor, Stresemann, he cherishes an instinctive sympathy for Russia, having traveled there before the War and learned the language. He is not an impulsive man and will not let his emotions run away with him, but he does recognize that, in relation to Poland, Russia may prove a useful ally. This does not mean that he plans to attack Poland, but rather that he hopes to be able to bargain for German neutrality in the more likely event of a Russo-Polish war.

THE DEVELOPMENT of the British Empire and of the United States has helped to spread the idea that the inhabitants of the British Isles are in a class by themselves as world colonizers. Certainly no other people has spread itself quite so widely over the earth's surface, but its great achievements have distracted attention from the extent to which the Germans, likewise, have penetrated foreign lands. The *Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande* (the Association for Germanism Abroad) has just been celebrating its fiftieth anniversary and has taken advantage of that occasion to point out that there are now well over thirty million Germans living outside the Fatherland, as well as sixty-two millions within its frontiers. The association operated on a budget of 4,300,000 marks during 1929 and maintained three thousand local sections and five thousand study groups abroad. President Hindenburg wrote an introduction to the elaborate brochure which the association published, and Foreign Minister Curtius and ex-Chancellor Müller, a Socialist, sent telegrams of congratulation. The following table of figures compiled by the association shows how people of German blood are distributed throughout the world:—

Alsace and Lorraine.....	1,500,000
Belgium.....	115,000
Luxemburg.....	260,000
Denmark.....	50,000
Baltic states and Danzig.....	570,000
Russia.....	4,600,000
Poland.....	2,200,000
Austria and Hungary.....	6,300,000
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.....	4,700,000
Rumania.....	900,000
Italy.....	250,000
United States and Canada.....	9,080,000
South America and Australia.....	700,000

Can Britain maintain her Empire and the white race its world ascendancy on a falling birth-rate? An expert on the subject offers some impressive figures that do not apply to England alone.

EMPIRE and Population

By SIR LEO CHIOZZA MONEY

From the *Empire Review*
London Conservative Monthly

FEW PEOPLE REALIZE that in all the wide-flung dominions of the British Empire overseas, covering as they do one-fourth of the world's land area, there exist no more than about twenty-one million white people. It is a fact of serious importance, and its significance increases when we remember that the United Kingdom is itself rapidly approaching the stationary in point of population—that the fountain head of British migrants is drying up. Let us see how the white population of the Empire is distributed:—

*Estimate of the White Population of the British Empire
(Excluding the United Kingdom), 1929*

	WHITE POPULATION
Europe.....	600,000
Asia.....	500,000
Union of South Africa.....	1,800,000
Rest of British Africa.....	200,000
Canada.....	9,700,000
Newfoundland.....	300,000
Rest of British America.....	100,000
Australia.....	6,400,000
New Zealand.....	1,500,000
TOTAL.....	21,100,000

The preceding account of the position at the end of 1929 is perforce based upon estimates, and the figures are given roundly, but the margin

of possible error is small and cannot be large enough seriously to affect either the magnitude of the figures or the conclusions to be derived from them. In 1921, when census figures were available for many regions, the corresponding aggregate was 18,400,000, so that in eight years the growth of the oversea Empire's white population has been no more than 2,700,000, or at the rate of 333,000 per annum. It is a condition next to stagnation. It must further be observed that the figures of more recent years show the least progress.

Over four centuries have elapsed since John Cabot, the Venetian, landed in Newfoundland. Over 250 years ago the French-Canadian colony had assumed some importance. When, therefore, we contemplate the astonishing fact that in 1930 the enormous Canadian area of nearly four million square miles has a white population of fewer than ten millions, we have to regard this small growth as the outcome of centuries of endeavor. The second largest contributor to the Empire's white population is Australia, with a population of little more than six millions after the lapse of nearly a century and a half since the first white settlement. New Zealand counts hardly more than 300,000 families; its population of about 1,500,000 whites is only half as large again as the population of the city of Glasgow.

These three dominions are white countries almost entirely; it is far otherwise with the Union of South Africa, which at the end of 1929 had a white population of 1,800,000 as compared with a native population of six millions. If we take British South Africa as a whole, the white population is hardly larger than that of the Union, but the native population approaches nine millions. As things are going, in another twenty years the white population of the Union of South Africa will be less than two and a half millions while the native population will have increased to about thirty millions.

In the Britains beyond the seas, as in the British Isles, the birth-rate falls continually and the natural increase of small populations is growing proportionately smaller.

Unless, therefore, there is substantial migration from the mother country the small rate of increase we have noted as having taken place between 1921 and 1929 will decline in the future; in that case the oversea Britains will remain great in area but lamentably small in white populations. Thus, the natural increase of Australia is about 75,000 a year, and this trifling number is only too likely to fall, for the Australian birth-rate is tending toward our own low level. Australia's primary producers at the census of 1921, including all agricultural and pastoral farmers and workers, miners, and quarrymen, numbered no more than 598,604, a mere increase of 12,456 over the number revealed by the census of 1911.

It is for consideration that, while the white population of the Empire

is only twenty-one millions, no small part of that number consists of persons of other than British derivation. I am able to give from careful estimation the facts on this head for the census year 1921.

White Population of the British Empire outside Europe, 1921

	POPULATION
British stock (English, Welsh, Scotch, and Irish).....	12,501,400
Other Europeans.....	5,328,000
TOTAL.....	17,829,400

The Empire's white population of other than British stock in 1921 was composed mainly of 3,735,200 French Canadians and 919,500 South African Dutch. At the present time we may perhaps take it that in the British Empire outside Europe there are about fourteen million whites of British stock. The truth is, of course, that, while the British have migrated more effectively than any other European race, our migrants and their descendants are chiefly to be found not in the British dominions but in the United States.

We see how very necessary it is to increase the white population of the British dominions if they are to remain British. There is only one effective means of possessing a land and that is by virtue of peopling it. I have seen complacent things written about the slow growth of the Australian population, but it is idle to ignore the plain fact that when the first Australian census was taken in 1881 the continent had a population of 2,250,000 and that the lapse of nearly half a century has hardly more than doubled that small figure. In the same time the United States has grown to one hundred and twenty-two millions and Argentina to nearly twelve millions.

We may now with advantage turn to our own case in the British Isles. For long Ireland has been a declining nation, and her descent from the eight millions of 1841 to the round four millions of to-day means, as few people realize, that the Irish race, like the Jews, is for the greater part divorced from its fatherland. The Irish decline continues, and Scotland also has become a declining country. What increase remains is with England and Wales, where in 1929 the excess of births over deaths was only 111,000. It is true that this near approach to the stationary was partly the result of illness due to an inclement spring, but even if the death-rate had not been thus specially affected the natural increase last year would have been a mere 150,000 or so—a trifle in relation to the figures we are considering. Indeed, the small remaining natural increase which still appears in the registrar general's return for England and Wales is deceptive. The decline of the English population has already set in, and will soon reveal itself in an actual increase of deaths over births. How soon that decrease will take place we do not

know, because it is clear that the deliberate restriction of births is rapidly increasing and that the birth-rate will fall further.

I DO NOT think that the recital of birth-rates makes much impression upon the mind. If we want the facts in a form that can be readily understood, we may note that in 1914 the thirty-seven million people of England and Wales had 879,000 children, whereas in 1920 the thirty-nine and a half million people of England and Wales had only 644,000 children. I am quite sure that in 1914 no one, even among those who had closely studied the subject, foresaw that such an amazing decrease would take place in so short a period. The incredible has taken shape as fact.

The restriction of the population has already gone so far that a pair is ceasing to reproduce a pair. It is not difficult to understand the conditions of increase, of stabilization, and of decrease. Let me quote from that considerable authority, Mr. Robert Kuczynski, who, in his valuable treatise, *The Balance of Births and Deaths*, says:—

If each woman has two children who become parents in their turn, the population will hold its own. If she has three such children, the population will increase by one-half within one generation. If she has fewer than two such children, the population will sooner or later decrease.

What, then, is the position in England and Wales in this respect? There are some five million women of marriageable age unmarried, and this great army of celibates is increasing. Of those who marry, a considerable proportion are childless. Of those bearing children, a considerable proportion of families are restricted to one child. A further considerable proportion of families are restricted to two children. The number of families with more than two children is not nearly sufficient to make good the infertility of the majority.

Therefore, in England and Wales the case is that the average woman has fewer than two children; the English population is already in actual decline. Those who continue to preach restriction do not know that they are preaching to the converted.

So quickly has an entirely new situation arisen. In 1901, a period which to many of us seems as yesteryear, 930,000 children were born in England and Wales. This year the number is likely to be no more than 625,000.

I see it constantly said in the press that the poor are still breeding rapidly, and that it is only the 'cream' of the nation that is not reproducing itself. But this cannot be true. The wholesale fall in births which has occurred must be due to general restriction of births by all classes. Those who care to make themselves acquainted with all classes of the community can ascertain for themselves that this is so; it is quite the thing

now to find a young married laborer with one child and determined to have no more.

IT IS not my purpose here to enter upon a discussion of the pros and cons of birth control. I am concerned here with one point and one point only and it is this: the British Empire contains a number of white people small and insignificant in relation to the area occupied. This condition obviously menaces the permanence of the Empire. In the past the migration of British people has been possible because of a large yearly natural increase of population in the British Isles. This natural increase is disappearing, and will presently be replaced by a yearly and increasing natural decrease. It follows that Britain is losing her power to people her Empire.

Does it serve any useful purpose to point out what is happening? I do not know. All history shows that nations and empires cannot be saved from themselves, and that at periods when they might have prevented decline they ignored the existence of factors which seem very plain to us after the events. Here in England at this hour there is unfortunately a widespread opinion, utterly at variance with economic truth, that there is a definite amount of work going on and that by restricting the number of hands to do it there will be more work to go round per pair of hands remaining. This widespread and, as I think, idiotic notion, which even finds its way into the utterances of ordinarily thoughtful men, is undoubtedly giving a great impetus to the progress of birth control. Birth control is an excellent thing, but, as with most excellent things, its results are good or bad according to the degree of its application. Britain does not need large families; she does not even need universal families of moderate size. What she does need, unless she is to decline and to be no longer able or worthy to lead an empire, is the maintenance of small families averaging rather more than two children. And what is not yet realized is that we have already reached a point at which a family of more than two is becoming an exception.

It may be well to add that Britain is by no means the only nation which has been seized with this craving for self-destruction. With the degree of fertility which exists in 1930 in Britain, France, Germany, and Scandinavia, these countries are doomed to decline and to eventual extinction. Already, as we know, France has a falling population which has been barely maintained in recent years by the free importation of Italians and others. It is rather sad to think that the world each year contains a smaller proportion and an actually smaller number of so gifted a people. Britain is now set upon the same road.

Will France and Italy go to war? An impartial British expert shows where their interests conflict and how their problems should be tackled and solved.

Italy *versus* France

By A PARIS CORRESPONDENT

From the *Times*
London Independent Daily

THE RECENT SPEECHES delivered by Signor Mussolini in the course of his progress through Tuscany have come as a shock and a surprise to Europe, and most of all to France. Like most declarations made by prominent statesmen in public, they need to be read in conjunction with the events to which they refer, and for this reason alone it is worth while examining closely the present state of Franco-Italian differences.

In the process of what is commonly called 'liquidating the War' the relations between the two countries have not moved with the times. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan have reached an adjustment in their naval difficulties; France and Germany have gone far along the road to a *rapprochement*; the States of Central Europe have begun to settle down and are learning to live at peace with one another. Only Italy and France, among the western powers, preserve a sense of permanent grievance. So far all attempts to solve their differences, whether directly or through intermediaries, have sooner or later broken down. The 'quarrel between the Latin sisters' has become a sort of by-word in the press of Europe, which sees little use in their preaching peace to others when it is so ill-served nearer home.

So many attempts have been made by both to come to an understanding that the element of good will can certainly not be wanting. The more serious writers of both nations are fond of referring with pride to the great services the two countries have jointly rendered to civiliza-

tion in the past, and the urgent need for their coöperation in the heavy tasks that confront Europe in the future. In common with the rest of Europe they realize that the problems of peace cannot be solved unless France and Italy are in accord.

M. Briand and Signor Grandi are understood to have expressed the desire at Geneva that the conversations in Rome between M. de Beaumarchais, the French Ambassador, and the Italian Foreign Ministry should continue. In addition to the matters in dispute relating to Africa, the earlier conversations included a proposal for a pact of friendship and conciliation tending to bring the two countries nearer in the spirit of Locarno. Thus it may be deduced that the objects in view are: (1) a political pact of friendship and conciliation on a wide basis; and (2) the liquidation of Franco-Italian differences in a series of declarations, these having reference to (a) the status of Italians in Tunisia, and (b) the rectification of the frontiers of Tripolitania.

THE differences between France and Italy on the subject of North African expansion have their roots deep in the history of the newer colonizing movement. It is a mistake to consider the Italian forward policy in Africa as a by-product of Fascism. Italian discontent was aroused when the French, forty years ago, went into Tunisia with the consent of Bismarck, and Italy's warlike penetration of Tripolitania can be traced to the policy of Giolitti. The dispute as to the status of Italians in Tunisia really dates from the Italo-Tunisian Treaty of 1868. In 1896 the French forced the Bey to denounce this treaty and an analogous treaty with Great Britain. In our own case no difficulty arose, since nearly all the British subjects in Tunisia were Maltese, and all that was asked was that they should have the right of maintaining their British citizenship. A final settlement was made in an agreement with France dated May 24, 1923, accepting the automatic naturalization of British subjects only in the third generation, and not in the second, as provided by the French naturalization law of 1923. It is otherwise with the Italians, of whom there were, according to the census of 1926, some 90,000 in Tunisia. They derive their rights from the convention drawn up in 1896, which is liable to be denounced every three months—a precarious position indeed, especially in view of the French law regulating questions of naturalization.

This law of 1923 applies to all Europeans except Italians. But it is clear to anyone familiar with the principles underlying the French conception of nationality that the administration must look askance at so large and influential an Italian colony, and must offer to individual Italians every inducement to adopt French citizenship. On the other hand, Italy, especially since the advent of Fascism, has consistently

sought to retain her nationals settled abroad, in Tunisia or elsewhere, to regard them as *irredenta* and the bartering of their rights against territorial concessions in the light of a betrayal. Thus the suspicion is engendered on the French side that the Italian element designs to create an Italian 'state within the state,' by using its concessions under the 1896 convention to increase the number of Italian schools and institutions, with a view to future action.

On the other hand, Italian critics do not hesitate to declare that France has tried to circumvent the convention of 1896 by promoting legislation so unfavorable to Italians as to force them in many cases to seek French citizenship for economic reasons. Italians still outnumber the French in Tunisia, but it is believed that the margin has been reduced since the 1926 census owing to this policy.

In the recent negotiations the exact wishes of Italy have not been made known, though it is thought that the permanent status and control of Italian Government schools and the right of Italian agriculturists to acquire land on terms of equality with French citizens form the backbone of these claims. In the French proposals for a new régime to take the place of the 1896 convention it was suggested that Italy might be content with the most-favored-nation treatment, while during the next decade the French Government could take over the Italian schools by a purchase scheme, and the special legal privileges of the Italian colony could be gradually merged into the legal system of the country. This would mean that at some given date within the next few years the naturalization law of 1923 would become applicable to all Europeans alike. But just when the negotiators were approaching an agreement and the treaty of friendship and conciliation had been drafted, the Italians appeared to consider that their assent to it could only be had in exchange for a ten years' prolongation of the 1896 convention, together with a settlement of the boundaries of Tripolitania to the satisfaction of Italian claims.

THIS question of the Tripolitan frontier, though less vital than that of Tunisia, is considered by Italy to be of great importance. It also has its roots in old treaties, but the real dispute begins with the Treaty of London of 1915. Under Article 13 of this treaty Italy claimed the rectification of the western frontier in a way that would afford access to Tibesti and Lake Chad. In 1919 a certain rectification was made, which, in the view of the French, not only fulfilled France's pledge under the Treaty of London, but also completely and definitively determined the African situation of Italy so far as France was concerned. Italy rejected this view as being, in the words of Signor Tittoni, only a partial application of Article 13. Mussolini has since adopted the same view.

The territories in dispute have little intrinsic value, but they are traversed by caravan routes which link up the interior with the Mediterranean. From the administrative and strategical point of view it is maintained that the Italian troops can only hold Fezzan if they hold also the oases of Tibesti and Borku, and that the control of Fezzan is essential to their undisturbed occupation and development of the strip along the seacoast. The claim as originally put forward involved assigning to Italy some 400,000 square kilometres, for the most part mere desert. The French view is that to agree to this would be to jeopardize their own communications with Lake Chad, and they have never admitted that Italy had any right to the hinterland south of Tummo. This view is based on an old agreement, the Prinetti-Barrère accord of 1902, and does not take into account the new position created by the Treaty of London.

In any case it is clear that the Italian claim to the territory as far south as Lake Chad was a maximum demand, from which the Italian negotiators had already receded in the recent conversations. It had, in fact, been indicated in the Italian press that Italy's requirements could be met with the assignment of some 60,000 square kilometres, provided a settlement on other points favorable to Italy was obtained. At this point, however, the negotiations seem to have collapsed, and Signor Mussolini embarked on the campaign of speech-making which so astonished France.

It is evident that the range of material differences on these African questions is very slight, and that, if all extraneous matter could be cleared out of the way, an understanding might be reached that would be satisfactory to both parties. They have before them the example of Great Britain and France after the Fashoda incident, when a bold survey of all the points in dispute led to a settlement by treaty and laid the foundations of the Entente. But the persistent failure of France and Italy to come to terms on their North African problems suggests that other questions of a different character rise to the surface whenever agreement comes into sight.

IN THE attempts of France and Italy to reach an understanding on the points in dispute in North Africa, relations with other countries play an indirect but important part which may help to account for their persistent failure. Chief among them is the attempt made by each to exercise an influence in the Balkans, and especially in Yugoslavia. With the grim example of Austria-Hungary before their eyes it might be thought that both would be chary of embarking upon a policy of Balkan hegemony, and that no doubt is the case. But neither is able to let the other gain an advantage, and so the relations of both with

Yugoslavia since the War have had a checkered course, with results not altogether satisfactory for either.

The Franco-Yugoslav Treaty, upon which Italy looks with so much mistrust, is of a piece with the scheme for the organization of Europe by regional agreements relied upon by France, in accordance with her traditional policy, to preserve her security in default of a general treaty. After the War Italy desired to regulate all outstanding affairs with Yugoslavia and offered a treaty of friendship and conciliation. France was informed and replied that a treaty with Yugoslavia also figured in her own diplomatic programme. Italy thereupon produced a tripartite treaty which France accepted. In 1924 Italy signed a separate treaty with Yugoslavia. France raised no objection, merely informing Italy that her own negotiations with Yugoslavia would be continued. The Franco-Yugoslav treaty was prepared. Italy thereupon expressed the wish to extend the scope of her treaty with Yugoslavia and requested that the signing of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty should be postponed. France agreed to wait six months; at the end of this period, in the absence of any further sign from Italy, M. Marinkovitch came to Paris and the treaty was signed. Italy then declared that a new situation had arisen, and her treaty with Yugoslavia was not renewed.

A chapter of accidents of this character was hardly calculated to improve matters. Italy adopted an attitude of suspicion toward the exercise of French influence in Yugoslavia. It was suggested to France that, if the Franco-Yugoslav treaty were allowed to lapse, the whole attitude of Italy toward a general treaty of friendship and conciliation would be changed. But the French naturally could not see it in this light. After all, Italy had not joined in when she could have done so. They considered that they were committed to their policy in Yugoslavia, that their influence in that quarter was in favor of the maintenance of peace, and that in any case the two questions were quite separate. On behalf of Italy it was asserted that France was lending money to Yugoslavia to be spent with French armament firms, and that this steady arming constituted a danger to Italy. The answer was returned that Yugoslavia armed only for defense, and that the uncertain attitude of Bulgaria on the one side and Italy on the other gave her a perfect right to do so. These polemics, conducted largely in the open through the medium of an inspired press, were hardly of a character to improve mutual relations. Lately, the factor of Albania has been brought in to complicate the situation still further. Any attempt to transform the Adriatic into an Italian lake must have the most disastrous repercussion upon Yugoslavia, with ultimate consequences that the French have been quick to foresee.

There remains one other political question that weighs on the minds of Italians—that of colonial mandates. There was no mistaking Signor

Mussolini's meaning when he declared in his speech at Milan that Italy had emerged from Versailles with only a mutilated form of peace. It is admitted in France that in respect of the mandates Italy came off badly at the Peace Conference, being somewhat cavalierly treated by her allies and not very well served by her own diplomatists. The suggestion that the defect should be made good by the granting of a mandate to Italy in respect of the Cameroons, which has more than once been put forward on behalf of Italy, would not be accorded a moment's discussion in France, that region having now taken a very definite place in the French policy of colonial exploitation. Nor are the prospects of Italian coöperation in Syria any brighter. France, it is asserted, would be prepared to support Italian claims elsewhere. But where?

ONE may pass over in silence the oft reiterated rumors of friction on the Franco-Italian frontier between Ventimiglia and the Alps. They really form part of a much larger group of issues between France and Italy which may be classed as demographical. It is estimated that there are now about 800,000 Italians living and working in France. Italy's problem of expansion and the efforts to accomplish it are a natural result of the increase in the population; a further result is the need for an expansion of markets, which has become one of the main planks in the Fascist platform. On the surface the proposition looks simple: Italy has a surplus population and a lack of raw material, France has a shortage of population and is rich in raw material. But solution by an exchange has an ugly look when it is regarded more closely, and not unnaturally every congress on emigration has insisted on treating the two questions separately. Besides, Italy desires most ardently to retain those Italians who have sought their fortune beyond her frontiers. On the other hand, France, with a declining population, desires most of all to assimilate them, and of all the foreign elements in France the Italian has lent itself most readily to the process. A separate régime for Italians in France being out of the question, France offers reciprocity of treatment and a *modus vivendi* on the basis of the most-favored nation.

As for the economic aspect of Franco-Italian relations, Signor Mussolini has recently admitted that Italy's economic difficulties are those that are affecting the whole world, though it may be that the price of stabilizing the lira on a level dictated by national pride rather than strict economic principles is still being paid. The progressive industrialization of France is bound to bring a new competitor into the field against Italian manufacturers, especially in the Mediterranean. These matters, however, are determined by geographical and economic rather than by political considerations, and are in process of being regulated as far as possible by the usual commercial treaties.

It would be easy to neglect such *imponderabilia* as the reaction of these differences on the public mind, but in reality it plays a considerable part in maintaining the rift that separates the two nations. There is a natural clash between Italian Fascism and French democracy. Nobody in France disputes the right of the Italians to govern themselves as they think fit, and the same view is held no doubt by the Italians in regard to the French. Yet there is equally no doubt that large sections of the French people mistrust the spread of Fascism as a threat to their own liberties, and are apt to take the part of the *fuorusciti*, the Italian *émigrés*, in any question of right of asylum or in extradition proceedings. On their part the Italians in their press and on their platforms display a fine contempt for the French people of the present day, whom they affect to consider a race of degenerates—with an equally fine disregard for the marvelous recovery made by France after the War. The result has been to inflame the public mind in both countries and to render more difficult than ever the settlement of questions that need above all objective treatment in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

This aspect of the dispute is, after all, the family affair of two closely related peoples, and it does not become the stranger to do more than mark the consequences to Europe and the world. To compose these differences will not be an easy task, and a sound diplomacy will no doubt mistrust a facile solution. Past experience seems to indicate that negotiations confined to minor questions, with the persistent shirking of what is vital, will never solve the issues at stake. Petty concessions grudgingly made to meet petty demands can have no permanent effect. Their very accumulation points to the need of a broad understanding on a policy that will deal with the larger issues with a view to the general peace.

Here is the credit side of Germany's balance sheet—a striking record of political progress. No wonder the French are afraid that Italy will combine with their former foe to control Europe.

GERMANY

Set Free

By PIERRE LAFUE

Translated from *La Revue Universelle*
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SINCE 1919 the continent of Europe has been divided into conservative nations and revolutionary nations. The former are chiefly interested in upholding the treaties that established their victory or their rebirth and the others are no less eager to upset the present order. After the Peace Treaty was signed France at once put herself at the head of the conservative bloc. This was a very easy rôle for her to play, not only because she had been placed in a conservative position by the accident of the Versailles Treaty but also because such a position corresponded to her historical, moral, and political background. Having grown to full stature she believed herself a peaceful nation because at the end of such a long war she wanted to arrest the march of history at the high point of prosperity she had attained at that moment. To France peace chiefly meant crystallizing acquired results, maintaining the *status quo*. She did not even dare to extend her frontiers as far as the lower Rhine because she feared that it would be more difficult to solidify such a military frontier than to maintain the political frontier that was already deeply entrenched in tradition.

But in spite of all efforts the spontaneous coalition of conquering powers fell victim to intrigues and rivalries. Lloyd George, for instance, refused to enter an alliance with the French government because he feared our hegemony on the continent of Europe. There also existed a League of Nations that at least had the merit of maintaining contact

between the victorious powers and that was originally merely a conservative body destined to assure the stability of the new Europe. Firm friendship existed between France and Poland; and the smaller states of central and eastern Europe who were soon to form the Little Entente had no other thought than to establish themselves firmly on their new territories. Although Italy claimed that she had been maltreated by her partners she announced herself at that time as unalterably opposed to any attempt at treaty revision.

THE revolutionary nations, on the other hand, were not able to establish themselves as Germany would have liked them to do. Of course, a theoretic union between the Reich and Austria was at once realized, and the two countries virtually formed a single nation, though they still remained politically distinct. Turkey held aloof; Bulgaria and Hungary, hemmed in by conquering powers, felt too weak to join forces with the Reich. In 1922 Germany made advances to Russia, but this alliance was only a kind of promise, a mortgage on the future.

Moreover, the chief revolutionary states had to contend with formidable domestic troubles. In 1919 and again in 1923 Germany's political unity and economic structure were both threatened. Russia was suffering from a social and political crisis which ended in the armistice of the New Economic Policy in 1921. Furthermore, during all this time that the revolutionary powers were being held in check by the Versailles Treaty, a complete system of control and military sanctions had been organized against them. Our troops were occupying the Rhineland. The governments of the defeated powers only enjoyed a partial independence and could not risk making audacious gestures. For a long time the conservative bloc was incomparably more powerful than the revolutionary bloc, since both Italy and England rallied around France whenever danger threatened. Indeed, peace seemed to be firmly assured as long as this disproportionate balance of forces could be retained, in spite of our fundamental error in allowing a German empire to survive. But unfortunately the history of Europe since 1919 consists entirely of the gradual weakening of the conservative bloc and the steady rise of the revolutionary states. From 1925 onward the collapse of the victorious powers has been accelerated and the advance of the beaten states has been almost irresistible.

This situation is more the result of our own awkwardness than of any efforts made by our former adversaries. The Locarno Pact represented the decisive step, since it stated the principle that the stability of a certain region made more difference than the stability of all Europe. Thus the victorious powers were divided. The world at large understood that the peace treaties were not fully guaranteed by the nations naturally in-

terested in maintaining them, who, by bringing certain special guarantees to bear within a limited area, implicitly admitted that treaty revision elsewhere was no longer impossible.

Germany, moreover, took the initiative in proposing the Locarno Pact, Stresemann having fully understood the advantages he could win by such a diplomatic move. Without any show of defiance the governments of the conservative nations accepted his propositions. England even imagined that she had in this way fixed Germany's western frontier and that she would make the Reich recognize the *status quo* in one part of Europe. She did not understand that the Germans only agreed to contain themselves in the west in order to keep a free hand in the east. It was as if the Reich had thrown wide open the door leading to Poland while raising a solid barricade against the doors leading to France. In exchange for a promise of nonaggression Germany received the assurance that she would not be attacked on the Rhine, which enabled her to turn her entire attention to the Vistula. In this way the equilibrium that held in check the ambition of the German empire to expand in two directions has been shattered. The weight of the colossus now falls entirely on Poland. Of course, Stresemann did not contemplate opening a direct offensive on the *status quo*. His chief task was to give his country complete freedom of action. The Rapallo Treaty with Russia, buttressed by the Berlin Treaty, made the first break in the ranks of the victorious powers. This *rapprochement* with the east gave the Reich the power to resist the west. Supported by a Russia that is, of course, inorganic, but that still retains the advantage and prestige of immense size, Germany has been able to escape from some oppressions. But the Locarno policy became the essential instrument of liberation. Successfully playing upon the theme of pacifying Europe, Stresemann demanded and obtained sacrifices without making any himself.

SOON afterward he led Germany into the League of Nations and at once understood what rôle he was to play there. Though he may have been a good European at Paris and London he became at Geneva the protector of national minorities, quickly recognizing the force that the democratic principle of nationality would lend to his demands. Since that time the League has become nothing more nor less than a weapon in the hands of the revolutionary states, and instead of opposing efforts to demolish the peace treaties it almost seems to favor them. The Reich and Austria have entered on complete equality with other nations, and so could Russia if she wanted to. Thus the League loses all its value as a defensive organism for a conservative Europe.

The year 1929 witnessed decisive events that brought about the rapid decay of the conservative bloc. First of all came the victory of the

Labor Party in England, which broke the last contact between France and England. The two great conservative powers stopped coöperating in their defense of the Europe that had been constituted in 1919, and England now concerns herself entirely with saving her empire, forgetting that the aid of France is indispensable in this task. A succession of conferences then began, supposedly with a view to liquidating the War. And now the defeated powers are at last set free. It is a great occasion. A cry of joy arises from all the revolutionary states. From Vienna to Berlin, from Budapest to Sofia the people rejoice and announce that they will soon make use of the liberty that they have regained, that they have a new political rôle to play, and they begin embarking on audacious schemes that have long been forbidden them.

When Chancellor Schober returned to Vienna from the Hague one of the local newspapers remarked, 'The reëstablishment of Austria's independence means more liberty in foreign policy and opens up the possibility of exerting influence in a wider field of activity.' Soon more precise statements followed. The hope was expressed that Herr Schober would profit from this new situation 'to regulate economic relations with the Reich in such a way as to prepare the road for German unity.' Events at once began conforming to these hopes. The Socialist municipality of Vienna definitely adopted *Deutschland über alles* as its national anthem. Since Austria is not economically self-sufficient she is more than ever devoted to the dream of forming a vast empire with Germany in which Prussia will enjoy a fatal domination. In order to show its independence and to promote its great purposes Vienna is also making advances to Italy and cultivating closer relations with the Hungarians. The press of Budapest celebrates with enthusiasm the end of foreign control of its national finances. Bulgaria announces that she, too, can choose her friends and enemies and on receiving offers from Belgrade and Rome she indulges in the luxury of discussing these matters as an equal and is apparently reserving her decision.

In spite of the bad humor of certain extremists, Germany is by no means the last to take part in this joyous concert. 'Free hands, free hands,' exclaims President Hindenburg in the famous manifesto in which he announces to his people that great adventures are again becoming possible, a manifesto worthy of a Bismarck announcing the foundation of a new empire in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Simultaneously, the great coalition in German politics disappears. The Social-Democrat ministry falls as if to proclaim that the Locarno policy now interests Germany much less than it once did. The political leaders do not hesitate to reveal what the Reich will do with its new liberty. Monsignore Ullrich, an orator of the Roman Catholic Centre Party, declares that the Young Plan, by bringing about evacuation of the Rhineland, will give 'a greater freedom of movement to Germany's

foreign policy,' while Chancellor Brüning adds that Germany cannot renounce and will never renounce 'acting against the situation created by the Versailles Treaty.' Dr. Curtius, the foreign minister, states that the liquidation agreement with Poland was made, above all, to protect German minorities. 'The human bridge made up of Germans who remain in the corridor of the province of Posen will keep East Prussia from isolation.' The democratic leaders share these opinions and Herr Koch-Weser proclaims, 'We will not accept the separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany. If we have made peace in the west it is a first step in pursuing a strong, energetic eastern policy.'

THESE threats to the *status quo* are also threats to European peace. Indeed, do not all Germans really agree with Hindenburg, who by no means recommends the attitude of passive immobility so popular in France but who assures his fellow countrymen that they will use their recovered independence 'to make fresh progress'? Thus the vanquished powers at last dare to make public their designs, to make known their plans of destruction and the attack they are preparing against Europe and the victorious Allies. If they dare to arouse great hopes it is because they have really regained their lost ground and have become legal equals with the conservative states. The victorious powers still possess, without doubt, a superiority in armaments, but this advantage is only provisional. The time is not distant when the Reich will demand the right to arm in accordance with its 'defensive needs.' In any case, from now on one part of Europe has stopped exercising a preponderating influence on the other. The two blocs are in a state of balance. We are only awaiting the decisive event that will swing the scales in favor of the revolutionary powers, who will almost automatically annihilate the peace.

What will this decisive event be? All the defeated powers count on the defection of Italy. A Hungarian journal, the *Magyarság*, recently stated that Rome was trying 'to build up a bloc of defeated powers,' and 'was tending to enter an agreement with Germany, and, through Turkey, with Russia, with whom a community of interests has been discovered.' After giving a few instances of Fascist tolerance of the Soviets, this newspaper came to the conclusion that Hungary must associate with Italy to break victorious Europe. But nowhere have more enthusiastic comments and passionate hopes been aroused than in Germany, and an Italian newspaper speaks of the 'antique mediæval dream of the union between the Roman and the Germanic eagles.' The German deputy, Rheinbaben, dreams of an expansionist empire when he states his belief that 'the hour has come to enter into deep discussions with Russia as well as with Italy.'

These are not recent hopes. Ever since the signing of the Peace Treaty, Italy has been a very curious kind of conservative state. This crystallized, motionless Europe that France and her smaller allies tried to perpetuate always seemed strange to Italy, because that country is still growing and because, moreover, she believes that she was not paid enough for her wartime efforts. Italy was also quick to affirm that the present equilibrium could not satisfy her, that she believed in evolution and development. Since the triumph of Fascism her psychology and her economic and demographic position have led her to demand important and profitable changes. Yet in spite of all these factors the idea of seducing Italy and detaching her from the bloc of victorious powers seemed chimerical. Did not a real bond exist between her and them? Was she not just as much interested as we are in preventing German tendencies from growing immeasurably? Although Berlin attempts to persuade Rome that the *Anschluss* with Austria is less dangerous than a revival of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, wouldn't it really menace Italy more than it would ourselves? And has not Italy annexed the southern Tyrol, whose German population would revolt when the Reich and Austria join forces?

LITTLE by little the Italians tend to forget their obvious community of interests with the conservative powers. Just as France failed to grasp quickly enough the importance of the Italian factor in maintaining peace, so Italy has seemed to hesitate in deciding who her real adversaries will be. Her conflict on the Adriatic with the Yugoslavs, who are friends of France, has led her to proclaim that the peace treaties are oppressing her as much as they are the really defeated powers. Germany has, therefore, picked this moment to establish a bond between herself and Italy. The ill-prepared, ill-fated Naval Conference has officially drawn attention to a maritime rivalry that had not previously been openly proclaimed. Italy returned from London irritated and embittered in a kind of isolation, having cherished for a brief instant the hope of isolating France. The revolutionary states have therefore decided that the time has come to act on Fascist Rome and attach her to their cause. This enterprise is particularly dangerous since a conservative bloc animated by an energetic will no longer exists. France feels the world about her shaking to its foundations and her own weight in the European balance has been lessened by her military decadence. Only Poland remains devoted to the *status quo*, but Poland is caught between two fires. One member of the Little Entente, Rumania, is undergoing domestic difficulties and another, Yugoslavia, feels so sure of war with Italy that she can hardly be expected to watch over the peace treaties.

Facing this weak defensive coalition stands the Germanic mass, al-

ready firmly knit together, supported by Russia, with whom a new alliance is being attempted, and backed up by economic and financial agreements with distant Turkey. Having renounced all hope of defending their work, the conservative powers must reckon above all on a Germany that is being goaded into action from every side, a Germany that is breaking through its frontiers, that is fortified within by a republic that has wiped out local power and established the domination of Prussia, a republic excited by democracy and awaiting the opportunity to inflict this democracy on its neighbors in the name of popular rights. Are we on the eve of a shift of power? And if the Reich is going to take every means to provoke this shift are we going to do nothing to prevent it? Can we not understand that no peace will exist in Europe if the treaties cannot be maintained and that the treaties cannot be maintained without Italian aid? Can we not therefore clearly recognize that we can satisfy Italy, at least in part, without upsetting the whole continent and without creating dangerous precedents, whereas we cannot grant Germany the least territorial satisfaction without shattering the base on which peace reposes? Finally, will Italy recognize that she ought to be at bottom a conservative power; that she can achieve her most legitimate demands without provoking a general revision of the treaties, without destroying a structure that has been painfully built up and that she herself has helped to erect; in short, without making common cause with the defeated powers? The future of Europe unquestionably depends on the reply that Rome and Paris will make to these questions and the future of Europe has reached such a delicate point of equilibrium that the least displacement will plunge us into the abyss.

Here is the debit side of Germany's balance sheet—a dismal record of economic hardship which leads the editor of the *Prager Tagblatt* to urge all European nations to unite against America.

GERMANY in Chains

By TWO GERMANS
IN BOHEMIA

I. TRIBUTE TO THE CARTELS

By Walter Wannenmacher

Translated from the *Prager Tagblatt*, Prague German-Language Daily

GERMANY'S PRICE LEVEL for the past few years indicates that her economic life is not functioning normally. A kind of artificial hardening of the arteries seems to be impeding normal circulation. World conditions have resulted almost everywhere in a sharply falling price curve, but in Germany, where the situation has been particularly bad, this drop has been the least, and prices have remained steadier than anywhere else. At the beginning of March the German wholesale price index fell 10 points, or 8 per cent, below the preceding year's level, while Czechoslovakia, whose geographic and economic conditions most resemble those of Germany, experienced a drop of 16 per cent—just twice as much. Nor is this all. During the same period in which Germany's wholesale index underwent this relatively slight drop, her prices for economic goods rose 2 points, or 1.5 per cent, a paradoxical phenomenon.

Practical critics have known for a long time that cheap production is Germany's most vital problem. But how can Germany produce cheaply when the rising price of economic goods lifts her production costs? This, clearly, is the central problem of German economy and this anomaly is responsible for the bad business and increasing un-

employment of the past two years. The paradoxical rise in the prices of essential products keeps business from taking a turn for the better and hinders an increase of export trade, through which reparations are being paid. And, last but not least, this condition indirectly indicates a rise in the entire price level, which will stimulate excessive foreign imports into Germany. Attempts will be made, however, to check these imports by higher tariffs, which, in turn, will cause foreign countries to retaliate by raising their own tariffs against German exports, thus bringing further hardship to exporters and causing additional unemployment. In other words, the increased buying power of money, which has affected the whole world in the past few years, yields no benefit to the German worker.

AN analysis of the wholesale index explains why Germany is raising her prices in an almost suicidal fashion. The *Institut für Konjunkturforschung* (Institute for the Study of Markets) has undertaken the noteworthy task of computing from the wholesale index the prices of those raw materials and unfinished goods which the cartels control. In this way an index has been made of sixty-four typical cartel prices, and for two years this index has stood in increasing opposition to the index of uncontrolled prices. But to gain an idea of the extent to which German economic development is being hampered by the big profits accruing to the cartels, we must take into consideration other products besides raw materials and unfinished goods. We must also consider, in addition to official cartels, those monopolies which take the form of private agreements and special manufacturing arrangements. An index including these elements paints a picture which is in fundamental agreement with the Institute's index, but which shows even more clearly the upward tendency of monopoly prices.

For the long established monopolies are not the only enterprises which have raised their prices of late. Certain organizations of a syndicalist character which sprang up during the past winter have led to a greater penetration of German economic life by the cartels. Many prices which used to be free or which were only bound by loose agreements are now controlled by these organizations and fixed at an appreciably higher level than before. An analysis of prices already controlled by monopolies in 1926 reveals that the controlled prices of 1929-30 are 8 per cent higher than those of 1926, though during the same period the price index for free raw materials and unfinished goods fell 4 per cent. Free wholesale prices, on the other hand, have fallen 15 per cent since the high point of 1927-28, during which time controlled wholesale prices have risen seven per cent. This is not, however, a fair comparison, for one should always compare two equivalent periods, such as the de-

pression of 1926 and the depression of 1930, and not a boom and a depression. Nevertheless, it can fairly be estimated in the light of these figures that a difference of at least 10 per cent exists between Germany's natural and controlled price levels. The cartels are overcharging for their goods on an average of 10 per cent.

This is the key to an understanding of Germany's price anomaly. Her economic system is being crushed by the weight of the fetters in which the cartels have shackled it. The monopolists keep raising their prices, thereby increasing the cost of production and of living, while the free producers are being slowly squeezed to death between decreasing returns and rising costs.

Free German economy, which is bearing the terrific burden of reparations, must also pay the monopolists the tribute that their organized power demands. The extent of this tribute equals the ten per cent price difference between free production and controlled production. Furthermore, only a fraction of this tribute can be estimated; the immense losses caused by its widespread after effects must be left to the imagination. If we take only the most powerful cartels, monopolies, and trusts which are producing essential products and luxuries we find that during 1927 a total of 17,000,000,000 marks was paid for goods sold within Germany at monopoly prices. That this is a bare minimum will be seen from the fact that the German Ministry of Economic Affairs estimates Germany's price-controlled production at 25 per cent of her total production. But, if we take ten per cent of this minimum figure of 17,000,000,000 marks, we find that Germany is paying her cartels a tribute of 1,700,000,000 marks a year.

A ROUGH calculation of the production costs of a few typical products reveals that the goods for which the monopolists receive 17,000,000,000 marks cost them only about 13,500,000,000 marks. Add to this latter figure a 'bourgeois' profit of 10 per cent,—or 1,400,000,000 marks,—and a surplus profit of 2,100,000,000 marks remains—a figure considerably in excess of the extra 1,700,000,000 marks which we estimate that the public is paying. All this profit does not, however, go to the monopolists, but to foreign countries in which the goods are dumped at ruinous prices. The total loss which German monopolists suffer through their export trade amounts, according to random tests of representative articles, to at least 1,300,000,000 marks a year and this loss the domestic customer must meet. Thus from the surplus profit of 2,100,000,000 marks we must subtract 1,300,000,000 marks, which leaves the monopolists a net surplus gain of 800,000,000 marks.

Nevertheless, the public's overpayment of 1,700,000,000 marks remains the decisive figure. For while the monopolists are making a clear

profit of over 2,000,000,000 marks (their 10 per cent 'bourgeois' profit of 1,400,000,000 plus their surplus gain of 800,000,000), the rest of the economic system is operating either without profit or at a loss. If the cartels did not extort the 1,700,000,000 marks which represent, as we have shown, the difference between free and controlled prices, they would receive only a modest profit of some 300,000,000 or 500,000,000 marks, but free production could then expand unhampered by the chains that now bind it.

II. TRIBUTE TO AMERICA

By Rudolf Keller

Translated from the *Prager Tagblatt*, Prague German-Language Daily

ACCORDING to Walter Wannenmacher's article Germany is giving her own cartels and trusts extra payments of at least 1,700,000,000 marks a year—a figure almost as high as the average payment of two billion marks to the enemy states under the Young Plan. In view of this fact, it is well worth while to inquire how much of the latter amount goes directly to the governments of the victorious powers.

In the first place, the European states in question must pay the American Government an average sum of 1,365,000,000 marks a year, according to the estimate of Mr. Lamont of the house of Morgan, one of the authors of the Young Plan. This money represents the interest and amortization payments for the meat, munitions, and other supplies which American trusts delivered to the Allies during the War at several times the usual prices, and which the American Government later undertook to collect. Two-thirds, therefore, of Germany's Young Plan payments are simply handed over to the United States.

America is forever claiming to be the only country that entered the War on ethical grounds, that drew no profit from it, and that neither demanded nor received an indemnity. Doubtless it really believes this thesis. The individual is always inclined to value his own impulses more highly than his adversary's, a conceit from which nations do not seem to be free. Figures, however, speak an unequivocal language, and they leave no doubt that America in the long run drew the greatest profit from the War. This fact has been known for a long time, but we are less familiar with certain other matters. Not only must Germany pay 1,700,000,000 marks a year to domestic trusts, but the bulk of the Young Plan payments goes to private trusts in foreign countries and not to the governments themselves. Of the two billion marks paid each year on the Young Plan, 1,300,000,000 marks represent payments to American trusts for American war supplies and at least 500,000,000 additional marks go to the European and American financiers and purveyors of war

supplies, leaving not more than one or two hundred million marks for the Allies. In other words, the hard-pressed German people must hand over to various financial and industrial concerns three billion marks a year, whereas the Allies themselves receive only one, two, or at the most three hundred millions.

So slight is the interest of the German people in its most important economic problems that this elementary fact is not known to those whom it concerns. The emotions of the exploited German citizen are directed much more toward the enemy governments than toward those groups which draw most profit from his hardships. The deep emotional gulf between Germany and her neighbors to the east and west, which keeps growing wider, is one of the principal causes of Europe's decline. The relations between Germany on the one hand and France and Poland on the other leave little room for hope that Germany and France will receive any abatement from their principal creditor, America, within any conceivable period of time. We also usually forget that any abatement of American demands from the Allied debtors goes in the first Young Plan period two-thirds, and in the second wholly, to the credit of Germany. Neither France nor England nor Belgium nor Italy, but America, and she almost alone, together with the German cartels and trusts, is Germany's Shylock.

THE German people—as well as the French and English—have inadvertently misplaced their hatred and their love. Partly through mental laziness and partly through artificial stimulation, the old bitterness not only still lives but has been strengthened by Germany's almost unbearable burden. This makes it very difficult to explain to even the most intelligent and peaceful German citizen that his interests almost completely agree with those of the French citizen and workman, and that the fantastic sums he is paying are not going to France but, as we have seen, remain in her custody only for an instant and are then sent to America or are turned over to European financiers, many of them Germans. Ordinary Germans do not understand this situation, but, as they face a high cost of living whose causes they cannot grasp, they feel that a wrong has been done them and they become the prey of the German revolutionary parties of the right and of the left. If we estimate Germany's annual extra payments to her own cartels at a minimum of 1,700,000,000 marks and the part of the reparations payments which goes to war manufacturers and private interests at a minimum of 1,300,000,000 marks (and that includes only the American share), it will be seen that Germany alone is paying three billion marks for claims and overcharges. The legal title of her creditors is doubtful, to say the least, and a part of the sum could be saved if it were only possible for the

European states first to get together emotionally and then to organize economically against their Shylock.

America especially—not the Government but the organized private interests of the great republic—is preparing new assaults on Europe which, if they succeed, will cost as much as another devastating war. One of these is the subsidizing of American grain exports to the extent of \$500,000,000 yearly, a measure which has threatened European grain production without bringing American farmers higher prices. A second blow is the new tariff bill, which will put a stop to imports from Europe and at the same time strengthen exports through dumping goods at ruinous prices or at prices reduced by the Government.

To organize Europe against her own profiteers and those across the sea is a task too difficult for a single generation, but it would be a great step forward if France and Germany, those old, inveterate foes, could be made to see that their former conflicts have ended and that they now enjoy an increasing community, in fact nearly an identity, of economic interests. France understands better than Germany that American finance, through the arrogance of its trusts, has helped to increase the Communist peril in Europe. France is also able to understand Europe's common needs because of the continued civilian occupation of her sea-coast, the Riviera, and the nicest parts of Paris by Americans, who create a feeling comparable to that caused in Germany by the military occupation of the Rhineland. Furthermore, Mussolini's threatening attitude is tending to make France attach greater value to maintaining cordial relations with Germany. One may regret these selfish motives, but that does not alter the important fact that sensible Frenchmen are beginning to adopt a new attitude toward Germany. It is only unfortunate that they could not have assumed it earlier, for it does little good at present to show Germans that France, though a third smaller than Germany, is paying 3,600,000,000 marks in interest each year, in large part to the same creditors to whom Germany is paying her 1,950,000,000 marks under the Young Plan, while England, also a smaller country than Germany, has been paying each year since the War 6,300,000,000 marks on her debts, excluding amortization, most of which also goes to Germany's creditors.

Nations are made of men, not adding machines, and their love and hate cannot be bought even for billions, nor are they interested to know that together with other European powers, big and small, they form a single bankrupt estate which is being badly informed and badly managed by its executors. The time is yet far distant when European producers can unite to cut down the demands of their foreign and domestic creditors by even a few millions, but we must either hope or fear that the growing need will one day suffice to sweep away the temperamental hindrances which now prevent an alliance of the debtor nations.

A plea for an anti-American federation of Latin states backed up by Britain. The fact that it appeared in the semi-official organ of the French Foreign Office lends it real significance.

Pan-America *and* Pan-Europe

By LOUIS GUILAINE

Translated from *Le Temps*
Paris Semi-Official Daily

JUST AS M. BRIAND is presenting his memorandum to the governments of Europe certain skeptics are announcing their belief that the undeniable crisis that the Pan-American movement has reached constitutes a discouraging prospect for the great idea of Pan-Europe.

This impression, however, is not justified, if one takes the trouble to observe that Briand's initial plan is less ambitious than the Pan-American idea, whose basis was laid at the first Pan-American conference in Washington in 1889. Furthermore, we should bear in mind the essentially different political conditions on the two continents. The Pan-American Union suffers from a fundamental lack of balance due to the prodigious dominance of the power that created it. That power, the United States of North America, has attempted, by means of the Monroe Doctrine, originally designed to protect the new world against European colonial ambitions, and the Pan-American Union, to establish a policy of control and tutelage over the inferior republics of Indian and Spanish America. Manifest destiny, according to the spread-eagle conception of the North Americans, means that the star-spangled banner shall fly over the whole new world. The Pan-American Union has not mitigated or corrected this disequilibrium but, on the contrary, has accentuated it.

What has happened? This unrivaled nation whose ascendancy over twenty others the Monroe Doctrine already assures has also acquired

through its greater population, wealth, and industrial development a preponderance through which it has subordinated the Pan-American Union to its own selfish interests. Thus the Pan-American Union has by force of circumstance become an instrument in the hands of the great North American republic. Pan-Americanism has fully realized the ideal of manifest destiny cherished in the United States. Pan-Americanism enabled the great Anglo-Saxon republic to expel Spain from her last colonies during the war of 1898. Pan-Americanism also made it possible for the United States to annex Porto Rico, to impose its tutelage over free Cuba, to acquire the Panama Canal and a concession for a canal in Nicaragua, to control that republic as well as Haiti and Santo Domingo through a military occupation, to dominate the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and to establish rapid connection between its Atlantic and Pacific fleets by means of the Panama Canal and various naval stations in the Antilles. Through the Pan-American Union the United States has gained an incomparably strong strategic position in the future centre of world politics, whence its activities will radiate both toward Europe over the Atlantic Ocean and toward Asia over the Pacific.

IN THE economic sphere, the Pan-American Union has introduced North American financial control into most of the southern republics. Through this control the United States has succeeded in developing its export markets at the expense of European business. It has set up financial organizations modeled on its own. It has obtained numerous concessions in the way of plantations, oil fields, and mines. It has multiplied its capital investments in the form of national loans and public-service enterprises and it holds a substantial mortgage on the natural resources of Latin America.

If we examine the past forty years of the Pan-American Union we at once recognize that it has brought immense profit to the United States. The privileged position that the great Anglo-Saxon democracy enjoys in the Pan-American Union has no parallel anywhere in the world. This position permitted the United States to bring to bear a decisive influence in the World War and to become the supreme arbiter of all the belligerent states, while at the same time it became their creditor. And, finally, at the London Conference America imposed naval parity on Great Britain.

Latin America, far from drawing any corresponding advantages from this continental league, has to bear all its burdens. Many enlightened spirits in Latin America have awakened from what the Brazilian writer, Eduardo Prado, at the end of the last century called the 'American illusion' and believe that Pan-Americanism can only

serve to dupe Latin America and that the continent can win none of the moral or material profit it had hoped for. Reciprocity is the essential condition of all coöperation, but continental standardization in the New World has been tending to suppress and even to eliminate the Latin American ideal. If the Pan-American movement continues to develop along these lines it threatens to end in a political and economic failure.

Here are the reasons why it has failed politically. First, the independence of the southern republics has not been consolidated and fortified by a continental agreement based on the Monroe Doctrine. The fact is that this doctrine is interpreted and applied solely by the United States for its own profit and the United States has compromised the independence of its southern neighbors by imposing on them a régime of tutelage and intervention. Secondly, the statute of the Pan-American Union contains no political safeguarding clause and no guarantee of security. Thirdly, the development and normal functioning of democratic institutions in the associated republics is not favored, and the policy of intervention undertaken by the United States tends to undermine the constitutional laws of the other republics by imposing and maintaining whatever illegal governments the intervening power chooses to establish. Such was the experience in Nicaragua and Haiti, where insurrections and popular movements finally forced the United States to put an end to the unconstitutional condition that intervention had created and sustained. Fourthly, the associated republics do not always find that dollar diplomacy applies the principles of fair play which they expect of it, as happened in the case of the naval stations in Cuba.

Here are the reasons why it has failed economically. First, the Pan-American Union has not brought about the continental customs union inscribed on its programme, but on the contrary protective tariff walls have steadily risen about the United States and they affect the republics belonging to the Pan-American Union just as much as they do nations on other continents. Secondly, the restrictive legislation on immigration in the United States applies indiscriminately to members of the Pan-American Union exactly as it does to other countries.*

‘THEREFORE,’ asks the *Diario del Plata* of Montevideo, ‘of what use is this Union to us? What benefits do we draw from it? Would we not do better to withdraw?’ The disillusionment that such expressions of opinion reveal does not, however, justify us in concluding that the solidarity of the Pan-American Union will be broken. Nor should we condemn Pan-Americanism, since it is still in an early state of develop-

* M. Guilaïne is not quite accurate on this point.—*The Editor*.

ment. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the same causes that are provoking the present crisis will bring about the necessary reaction, restoring the balance and making possible a more satisfactory development of this continental system. We recognize favorable signs of such a reaction in the movement favoring an Hispano-American bloc of powers and a South American customs union, in the tendency of the South American delegates to the League of Nations to enter into concerted action, and, finally, in the recent tendency of North American diplomacy to return to a sane and just interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.

In any case, the incomplete history of this continental movement and the evident distress of Pan-America do not provide a strong argument against the possibilities of achieving a European union. The inequality of the various powers represented in the Pan-American Union will not exist in Pan-Europe, where no one power enjoys a preponderance over the rest. Even the British Empire, in spite of its naval supremacy in European waters, which, after all, is justified by its insular position and its immense colonies, cannot pretend to enjoy such a hegemony. Furthermore, Europe already possesses what Pan-America lacks, an organized League of Nations. Regional security pacts like the Locarno Treaty and the Little Entente have formed a basis for political groupings that should assure the equilibrium of a new Europe where compulsory arbitration, disarmament, and a tendency to federation will replace the former balance of power.

Still other groups, which will bring harmony and unity into this new Europe of ours, are contemplated, among them a Danube federation as a counterpoise to the Germanic bloc and to Moscow. A Mediterranean group is also planned, including Great Britain, and on this basis a union of Latin nations which would prove an indispensable part of any European union may develop. If this Latin union could be extended and filled out on the other side of the Atlantic by a group of Spanish American powers, Great Britain, disturbed as she is by her loss of naval supremacy and by her economic difficulties and her troubles with the Dominions, would have every reason to support it. Indeed, this Latin union is perhaps at the moment a decisive factor in creating a Pan-Europe and a Pan-America that would evolve together peacefully and harmoniously toward the common ideal of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, which should become the sole law of both continents.

One impression all visitors to Russia share—it is a country of abounding life. Even the Moscow streets throb with the same energy that has opened up Central Asia via the Turksib Railway.

MOSCOW Stretches East

By TWO RUSSIAN
CORRESPONDENTS

I. RUSSIA'S NEW RAILWAY

By Wilm Stein

Translated from the *Vossische Zeitung*, Berlin Liberal Daily

THE SPECIAL TRAIN from Moscow, bearing Government and Party representatives, workers' delegates and journalists, both native and foreign, to the opening of the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad, or Turksib, as it is called, crossed the Ural River at Orenburg and started rolling across the endless, solitary steppes of a country given over to camels, horses, cattle, and the round tents of the nomads who own them. The journey through European Russia had provided only fleeting opportunities for observation. We could see that the spring crops were well under way and that a great quantity of shiny new agricultural machinery had arrived, including tractors. Near the larger stations we saw new warehouses and grain elevators built to assist the collective farm movement. In little villages the sound of church bells showed that the government is pursuing a policy of forbearance toward the peasants.

On the other hand, the food shortage is clearly much more acute outside of Moscow than in the capital itself. People in the stations complained of the meagre rations of bread and the lack of meat and the empty station buffets offered eloquent testimony of the universal distress. No sausages, no ham, no eggs, no cigarettes were offered on sale. The counters at which they were usually dispensed were empty and

covered with dust. A notice that had been posted in bygone days read like a sneer: 'It is forbidden to sit at the table without ordering something'; for there is nothing to order now. A bare minimum is provided for the employees but nothing is left over.

As we penetrated further into Asia and approached the new Turksib Railway we heard more and more propaganda. Everywhere we stopped, crowds of people surrounded our train, meetings were held in the drawing-room car of the government representatives and swarms of zealous, well-trained propagandists scattered through the crowds to stimulate the voice of the people and to use their demagogic skill helping the crowd to forget its everyday troubles and to believe more firmly in the panacea of Communism. And everywhere the voice of the people seemed to say, 'All honor to the Turksib; all honor to the Government and to the Five-Year Plan; but if we do not soon get more to eat, if we continue to live in misery and cannot buy enough with our wages on a free market to keep alive, we shall have no use for the Turksib or for the Five-Year Plan.'

THE peasants complain that they have no money and the workers that they have no place to live. One hears the same refrain everywhere with constant variations, but the fundamental note is one of the deepest depression, and the spiritless attitude of the workers and peasants is identical. They show no trace of resistance, but only shattered energy, resignation, and indifference. A few hopeful, idealistic voices praised the power of the Party and the plans of the Government but they were quite drowned out. The industrious propagandists on our official train replied to the downtrodden people with huge lists of statistics and pleaded that in a little more time things would be better, only to deviate into attacks on the capitalists and the enemies of the working class. The backward, primitive, uncultivated inhabitants of this country have only two interests in life, food and clothing. Since both are lacking they complain, often merely uttering a low murmur as the Government train goes proudly steaming past them with its red flags and banners flying. For the Government train cannot provide food and clothing; it demands new sacrifices and fresh hardships as a necessary preliminary to the coming dawn of Socialism.

None the less our propaganda train makes its way through Asiatic Russia just as it did through European Russia. At each station a few genuine enthusiasts or ambitious party workers circulate among the crowd, setting propaganda in motion. The result is that the train made a considerable impression with its proud drawing-room car and the banner on its engine reading, 'As an answer to the Pope in Rome and to the capitalist world for its crusade against the Soviet State, we are opening

the Turksib Railway.' And finally, various gentlemen from Moscow who occupy high places in the Government all agree that it will be better a year hence, two years hence, three years hence, though in reply to these arguments the people merely spit disgustedly and go trudging back to their work.

The Turkestan-Siberian Railway represents something more to the present masters of Russia than merely the first great railway that they have built in accordance with their new economic plans. Turksib, in the minds of the Russians, is a symbol and a programme. It symbolizes their economic system, for it is the first major achievement in their plan of reconstruction; and it represents a programme in that it will help to organize the big separate republics of the Soviet Union around a central economic plan for the development of their resources and for their organic participation in the entire socialized economic unit of the Soviet State.

The idea of the Turksib is to enable the one hundred and forty-six million inhabitants of the Soviet Union to support themselves on their own raw materials. The primary purpose of this railway is to transport cotton and to emancipate the Soviet textile industry from foreign imports. Naturally it will take the Turksib years and perhaps decades to accomplish this task, but the first step has been taken and the railway itself built. Naturally, too, many new difficulties will arise, and many conflicting interests between the Moscow central government and the local authorities will occur. No one can yet tell when the Turksib will be able to solve the cotton problem in accordance with the programme laid down in Moscow.

Why, then, was it built? Huge stretches of Central Asia, including what was formerly Turkestan, and the southern parts of Kazak and Kirghiz are suited to cotton growing, but at the present time only twenty per cent of this land is so employed, while three-fourths is planted with rice, maize, wheat, and cattle fodder. Moscow now demands that all country suited to cotton growing shall be employed for cotton growing only. Fodder for animals may still be grown, but only enough to feed animals that work. Animals for slaughter will no longer be raised in this part of the world since the herds of Kazak can provide Central Asia with its meat supply via the Turksib Railway. Rice will also no longer be grown since it can be produced in Kirghiz and south Kazak and transported from there over the Turksib. The same is true of wheat, and the Turksib Railway will provide Central Asia with its supply of flour from Siberia and Kazak. The seed lands of Kazak now comprise four million hectares which have been cultivated with a view to the construction of the Turksib Railway but in three or four years it is hoped that fifteen million hectares will be in use. The second function of the Turksib will be to carry wood and building materials from Siberia

to Kazak and Central Asia. There are no trees in these two districts, so that both of them will have to turn to Siberia for building materials for their various industrial enterprises.

WHAT the future possibilities of the Turksib Railway may be and how long a time will be required to develop them no one can say. But every additional acre of land that is turned over to cotton growing represents an economic advance, and apart from all dubious future prospects the Turksib is already proving an unquestioned benefit and represents the only way in which certain difficulties can be overcome. For this reason its completion is an historic episode of the first importance. The Orenburg-Tashkent line was the first and the Turksib is the second railway to connect our part of the world with the desolate steppes of Russia, which include a territory six times the size of Germany—a territory that is now known as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazak. This tremendous stretch of country contains some deserts, to be sure, but it is also rich in salt, petroleum, coal, and fur-bearing animals, from the tiger to the ermine. But, above all, it has endless expanses of fertile soil which the railroad traverses for days on end and which stretch from horizon to horizon. Water is to be found, for even at a distance from the great rivers wells can be successfully dug. These steppes now serve as pasture country for herds of camels, sheep, and horses owned by the nomad Kazaks who have been wandering about here since the time of Jenghiz Khan, living in the same kind of tents they occupied in his day. They have never raised a finger to cultivate the steppes from whose rich soil the fodder for their animals grows. When one makes the journey on the old Orenburg-Tashkent Railway one sees what the Turksib will eventually accomplish. Workers on the railway will arrive and build houses, lay out gardens, and cultivate small fields. Colonizers will come, settlements will be made, towns and cities will grow up, industry will be established, schools and medical attention will follow. The steppes will wake to cultural and economic life all along the broad zone of the railway.

II. Moscow, 1930

By Heinz Pol

Translated from *Die Weltbühne*, Berlin Radical Weekly

IN SPITE of all that one has heard and read about Moscow it makes a terrifying impression. One thinks first of all of Berlin in 1919 and 1920, for Moscow wears the same gray, torn, depressing aspect that characterized our own capital during the first post-War years. The people one

sees hastening across the great terrace of the Belorusski station are not actually in rags, but they are ill clothed and pale.

The Twerskaia, the most important street in the city, runs in a curve from the Red Square to the Opera and to the big hotels where the foreigners stay. As one walks along this thoroughfare Moscow teaches its first lesson and one discovers that there are no good or bad quarters, no elegant avenues, no dreary side streets, no wastefully or shabbily decorated shops. All Moscow looks like the Stettin Station quarter in Berlin. Gray is the universal color and the people in the streets blend into a formless mass. Every man, without a single exception, wears the English type of cap, and every woman has a kerchief on her head.

It takes the average European at least three days to get used to this new atmosphere and to be able to recognize any other color besides gray. One then perceives that one's first impression was entirely correct. The streets and the people in them may appear lively and bright but the scene as a whole is monotonous and completely standardized. Of course, not everyone is clothed exactly alike. One man will have on a good pair of shoes, another a fairly respectable coat. Occasionally you see a woman with elegant low shoes and artificial silk stockings, the greatest luxury of all, making her way through the crowd. But differences in costume are so slight that no one thinks of judging a man by his clothes in Moscow. When we Europeans speak of a man in good circumstances we at once form a complete mental picture of him from his crêpe-soled shoes to his English felt hat. But in Moscow nobody enjoys good circumstances, and if you happen to see a carefully dressed man don't decide that he is a surviving 'Nepman' or an upstart bourgeois, for he is probably a foreigner or some specialist living in Moscow, or perhaps a proletarian who through special circumstances happens to have come by a good overcoat. Class distinctions in the way of dress do not exist. I was assured that a year or two ago clothing was of better quality and sold for less than at present, so that people cut a more presentable appearance, but for the last six months the price of shoes and clothing has risen steadily and is now almost as high comparatively as the price of food. A pair of the simplest shoes costs forty rubles, almost eighty-five marks.

AS I have said, no one pays any attention to the etiquette of dress in Moscow, not even the former members of the middle class, who before the War kept up with the latest fashions from Paris and London. In the theatres of an evening one sees perhaps two or three decently dressed men and an occasional young girl wearing a dress that might be made of silk. Her companion, however, turns out to be a young workingman in overalls with no collar to his shirt. One gets used to these surround-

ings surprisingly quickly. The young generation here is eager to be as clean, respectable, and comfortable as it can under the circumstances, but even if raw materials were available the conception of style in our sense of the word could never play any great part. If you were to tell the average twenty-year-old youth in Moscow that gentlemen's tailors in London had decreed that blue material with a small check was being worn this summer and if you went on to relate that this dictate was known to several hundred thousand male Europeans and was unconsciously influencing millions more, he would look upon you as a lunatic.

For my own part, I made a rather interesting observation. During the May Day parade of troops across the Red Square I stationed myself in the diplomatic box, where I was surrounded by men in cutaways and frock coats wearing stiff shirts and shiny silk hats on whose glistening surface one could see reflected the red handkerchiefs of the girl athletes as well as the gray caps of six hundred thousand demonstrating workers. My first impression was a painful one but I soon had to laugh and presently discovered the reason for my mixed feelings. This little island of west Europeans including the English ambassador and the Polish consul general, this little handful of officials surrounded by a marching army and crowds of singing people looked like some relic of day before yesterday and simply did not have any place in this world. Our box was merely a black speck on the brightly colored May demonstration in the Red Square. I have never experienced a more uncanny sensation.

One of the first things you notice in Moscow is the crowd of people standing outside provision stores, although there are not nearly so many of them as our newspaper dispatches would have us believe. A shortage of meat exists; butter is very hard to get, and there is also a lack of eggs and of lemons and other fruit. Perhaps, however, 'lack' is not quite the right word, for you can buy as large a supply of butter, eggs, meat, and lemons as you wish if you have enough money. The shortage is relative, but in a rather peculiar way. The inhabitants can buy limited rations at reasonable prices, but anyone who wants more than his ration must pay fantastic amounts. As a general rule no one goes hungry, but everybody spends most of his income getting enough to eat. The food business is the only activity that has not yet been entirely socialized or communized. The reasons for this are well known. Even in Russia the peasant does not adapt himself to change and hence many free markets exist in Moscow, doing business openly in the great squares. They are black with eager crowds, but not all these people are buyers. Many simply wander with hungry eyes from stand to stand, asking the price of everything. Peasants and their wives sit on boxes, peaceful and indifferent, looking the city people in the eye and naming their price. The prospective buyer attempts to bargain but the peasant shakes his head. He can afford to wait until the next purchaser arrives.

The price of food in these free markets is on an average four or five times as high as prices in Berlin. A pound of butter costs about two dollars. I was pleased to notice that no one made any attempt to conceal from foreigners how miserably fed the country is. We lived in a hotel where we never got any butter and for breakfast only had a glass of tea, two slices of miserable sausage, and some dry bread. That was all, and yet the Russian travel bureau had especially recommended this hotel.

HERE is a little catchword for visitors to Moscow. Everything in the Soviet capital is just like Berlin except that it is completely different. Let me explain this strangely comic paradox. Take business, for instance. The stores look like ours and are decorated in the same way, though of course always in the style that is found in the vicinity of the Stettin Station. Every line of business exists. There are photograph shops, flower shops, wine shops, a considerable number of confectionery shops, in short, everything you desire. The centre of the city is filled with department stores at whose entrances many people are standing. These buildings have big show windows like those in our own department stores, and even if they are less elegant they are decorated with real taste. When you go into such an establishment you find standing behind the counter a young man or woman who will ask you what you want, pack up your goods, and hand you your package.

If you want to get about Moscow, taxis may be had and the streets are also teeming with new American automobiles, exactly like those in Berlin. There is, however, this tiny difference. All these fine shops, warehouses, taxis, Buicks, and Packards do not belong to firms or to individuals but to the Russian State, to the City of Moscow, and to trade unions. *C'est la petite différence qui fait la musique.* Ninety-nine per cent of the business in Moscow has been taken out of private hands and only a few little shops down side streets are run by private individuals, most of them shoemakers, tailors, and the like. The bulk of the business is done by trusts. Three or four big buying and selling trusts own four-fifths of all the stores and business houses in Moscow, so that one keeps seeing the same names on the signs. The trust for the development of agricultural products, known as the 'Mosselprom,' has about five hundred shops in the city in which meal, chocolate, cakes, beer, vodka, cigarettes, and every kind of household commodity is offered for sale. Another group, known as the 'Kommunar,' owns nearly as many stores and sells suits, dress goods, shoes, linen, hats, and so forth.

The distinguishing characteristic of these selling societies can easily be explained. All goods are standardized, yet a tremendous variety of goods is on sale. Prices, of course, are standardized too. The result is that there are no good or bad purchases and no cheap or expensive

places to buy. In some shops, of course, there is a greater choice of wares than in others, but you do not pay more for the same thing in the city than you do in any suburb. There is a tremendous number of book-stores. Most of these are huge affairs with two or three show windows, decorated in the most modern manner. Perhaps this is why so many people cluster about them. But it is also true that books in Moscow are really cheap. A new series of novels issued by the state publishing house costs about twenty cents a volume and the smallest editions in this series run to fifteen thousand copies. One thing, however, is missing. There are no beer parlors, cognac shops, or cafés on any of the streets. There is only one very small refreshment shop, a last relic of the 'Nep' period, in an obscure side street, where one can buy a cup of coffee and eat a piece of cake, but aside from this there are literally no cafés in Moscow, and no distilleries either. Prohibition has really been put through here, but it is a special kind of prohibition. Only the sale of single drinks is forbidden and you can buy as much wine, beer, or vodka by the bottle as you wish in the government wine shops. It is forbidden, however, to drink anything in these shops or on the street or anywhere in public. One can drink only at home.

WHAT is the result? I shall not go into statistics, beyond pointing out that the consumption of alcohol in Moscow and other large Russian cities has declined two-thirds. I shall state only what I myself have seen. I did not lay eyes on a single drunken person in Moscow, although I went about everywhere during the two days' celebration in May. Many hundred thousand people were merrymaking, walking arm in arm, singing and moving through the streets and squares until late at night. They would fall into each other's arms and kiss each other, but no one was drunk, for no one could buy a drop of alcohol. People who were thirsty betook themselves to one of the many hundreds of kiosks at the street corners and bought themselves tea, mineral water, or lemonade.

Of course, alcohol is consumed in Moscow. But it is one thing to buy one drink after another in some 'nice' night club and quite another to pay several rubles in a wine shop, which closes at eight o'clock in the evening, for a whole bottle of wine which one must drink under the eyes of one's family. Yet man is a creature of habit. Although we Berliners found that prohibition was working splendidly, every evening at ten o'clock we felt an itching sensation in our throats and we would steal secretly to the bar of the Grand Hotel and have a glass of beer. For in the bar of the Grand Hotel one can drink beer and vodka, one can eat caviare, dance the tango and the blues, and do anything else one pleases. But this bar is a thing apart and occupies only some few hundred square feet in the heart of the proletarian city.

Laborites in office take more than kindly to the ways of aristocracy. Mrs. Snowden's 'best friend'—from Vienna—describes a week in Downing Street.

Visiting the SNOWDENS

By BERTA ZUCKERKANDL-SZEPS

Translated from the *Neue Freie Presse*
Vienna Liberal Daily

MY FRIEND, MRS. PHILIP SNOWDEN, had been urging me for months to be her guest in London and I was glad to be able finally to accept her invitation. On landing in Dover I encountered strict treatment, but as soon as I showed one of the customs officials a letter from Mrs. Snowden a broad smile spread across his face. He motioned to another official, saying, 'A friend of Mrs. Snowden. Please look out for her.' From this point on this official accompanied me through every step of the inspection and did not bid me farewell until he had put me in my railway carriage. This little incident only goes to show the great popularity that Mrs. Snowden enjoys in England, but the fact that she is the wife of one of the most influential men in the country is not the only reason for her prestige. Both the common people and high society admire her clear, straightforward character. They love her musical voice and appreciate her power and charm as a speaker. Whether she is addressing a large assembly or whether, as is so often the case, she is taking tea intimately with the King and Queen, she radiates a friendly spirit and an atmosphere of complete sincerity whose charm nobody can miss.

Downing Street. A long line of three-story buildings with a dark gray façade devoid of any ornament. The little narrow door of Number 10 leads to the quarters of Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister. The second door, Number 11, is the abode of Philip Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The two men are as close together as

possible and a secret door connects the two houses, though it has not been opened for a long time.

'An old, uncomfortable house,' says Mr. Snowden as we climb up the steep stairs covered with dark green carpet. 'There is no elevator, and anyone who has to go up and down stairs as often as I do gets very tired.' But the nobly proportioned rooms in this splendidly designed old building delight the eye. From my spacious, light bedroom I survey St. James's Park. Opposite me stands Marlborough House, the Prince of Wales's palace, and a third building closes one end of the open square. A grandstand is being erected outside, for the King's birthday is approaching and a military review is to be held. Every day out of the window of my room I witness an unforgettable performance. Each morning a regular inspection is held. The Horse Guards, dressed in red, white, and black, march by to the resounding music of a Scottish band and the generals look like silhouettes in their black uniforms against a background of white. The other officers are dressed in white and ride black horses with white saddles. The troops have been strictly trained and go through their drill as faultlessly as the most famous troupe of American dancing girls. The whole picture reminds me of some mediæval tournament.

A BELL rings for dinner. There are big reception rooms on the ground floor and the second floor includes the drawing room, Philip Snowden's study, and the dining room. A bright fire is crackling in the grate, although rhododendrons are blooming outside. We dine alone, for Philip Snowden only eats at home over the week-end. He goes to Parliament early in the morning and seldom returns until midnight. Ethel describes the bewildering life she leads as his wife and only secretary. She answers fifty to a hundred letters a day, performs official duties, writes speeches, and finds time to lead a social life. Music is everything to her and the London season is full of it. At the present moment she is bending all her energies to prevent the fine old Covent Garden Theatre from being demolished.

Almost every day at noon a reception is held at Downing Street. 'To-day you must help me. I have invited the International Student Society. You will meet Germans and Austrians. In my opinion our most important task is to foster the international youth movement. In order to assure the future we must help people to come to know each other and understand each other in spite of political boundaries.' A few Indians in their sky-blue native costumes, as well as a number of Chinese, Finns, Spaniards, Austrians, Germans, and French appear. All the dominions are represented. A delegate from South Africa converses with me at length. 'You Austrians won't really be able to live until

free trade is universal, and our situation in South Africa is precisely the same. We shall suffocate if we do not get free trade.'

Mrs. Snowden interrupted him. 'Here is some good news for you. We have formed a committee to propagate the doctrine of free trade. When we started we estimated that not more than three hundred people would attend our first meeting, but no less than fifteen hundred appeared, so that we had to hire a bigger hall. The majority of those who came were big industrialists. That is a most important symptom.'

I was invited to a big evening party which the German ambassador gave before the close of the opera season. Lotte Lehmann sang and Bruno Walter conducted. It was a great occasion. The court attended in full regalia and the stairs leading to the main room where the festivities were being held presented an imposing appearance. The ambassador met the representatives of the royal family in the vestibule and the voice of the major-domo announcing the names of the various guests rang out loudly. The scene here bore no resemblance to that in the Covent Garden Theatre the day before, where an atmosphere of super-elegance, even more refined than that of Paris, had prevailed. Here people stood in stiff, official ranks, dressed in their court uniforms and dresses. I met MacDonald, whose acquaintance I had previously made in Vienna. He looked nervous and rather tired and I presently discovered that the first signs of an approaching crisis had made themselves felt that evening. When Mrs. Philip Snowden entered the room on the arm of the German ambassador, MacDonald leaped to his feet and offered her his seat.

Later two huge buffet suppers were served, one for the members of the royal family, and the other for ministers and other guests of honor, each group being seated at a round table. After supper Ethel Snowden introduced me to Princess Louise, the aunt of the King. 'My best friend, an Austrian friend,' she said, and the Princess spoke cordially about Austria and our splendid music. A great many people asked me about the Salzburg Festival, for it has become very fashionable to go there now. We did not return home until after midnight, but the door of Snowden's study still stood open. He was seated at his writing desk. 'Oh, please come in!' he called out to me and we chatted together for a short time. I could detect no fear of the impending crisis in his sharp clear blue eyes, but when I wished him good night he shook his head: 'I must stay awake a long time. It is a hard job.'

THE next day Sir Oswald Mosley resigned from the government, creating a crisis of the first water. Nevertheless, Downing Street continued to pursue its accustomed pace. In the afternoon Mrs. Snowden received two hundred and fifty people for tea and rows of gilded chairs

were set out in the big reception room. The occasion was the formation of a society to help poor women to an education and to free them from some of the miseries of their everyday life. Tories, Liberals, and Socialists, ladies from the highest social circles and intelligent working women had all gathered together to hear Ethel Snowden speak. She described in a few clear-cut and quite unsentimental words the life that the average woman leads. She appealed to the common conscience of all, to the sympathy of one human being for another.

'First of all, this question must be taken entirely outside of politics. I want to take this occasion to protest against making humanitarian questions political. The association we want to form now will serve as a symbol of this idea. All that we want is to give the working woman every opportunity for social development. Each individual, as soon as she has formed an opinion and come to an independent judgment, can then decide what path she will follow, whether she will prefer a Conservative, Liberal, or Socialist point of view. A free choice. Nothing shall hinder her in making one, for our cause has nothing whatever to do with propaganda. Time alone will be able to assist us in achieving our programme and I am firmly convinced that we shall succeed.'

When we were dining together later I expressed to Ethel my amazement at her bold declaration, which was so different from what one hears in countries where party lines are strictly drawn.

'Our political education runs back for centuries,' she replied. 'No party man in England fears being misunderstood by other members of his party when he takes it upon himself to come to an understanding with political opponents on certain subjects. On political grounds and in Parliament we are enemies to the death, but we also maintain certain great traditions. The retiring Prime Minister, for instance, always makes a speech congratulating his successor and socially there is no hostility at all. Indeed, hearty friendship often exists.'

Let me describe an experience illustrating how highly this right of individual liberty is esteemed in England. I was particularly interested in a marvelous Scottish chorus that I hope will visit Vienna next year. Its leader is a great musician but also a great eccentric. He refuses to recognize the universal custom at concerts and theatres of playing the national anthem, taking this stand on a purely artistic ground, since he believes that a programme of music is a separate entity and that the purity of its effect should not be spoiled. During my visit this chorus was invited to sing before the King and Queen at Balmoral. After the first intermission the King summoned the leader to tell him how much he had enjoyed the artistic perfection of the chorus and then added, 'I beg you to lay aside all feeling of compunction here. You must feel at home and since you have artistic reasons for not singing the national anthem at your concerts don't make any exception to-day.' The leader

was so pleased by this fine display of tolerance that he had the hymn sung at the close of the concert.

LATE one evening we went to a private theatrical performance to which the Earl of Clarendon had invited us. He had just been appointed governor of South Africa and was giving a farewell party to his friends in his fine old house, which the elder Pitt used to occupy. Suddenly an atmosphere of excitement began making itself felt—'Mosley has handed in his resignation.' The news had just arrived. Interest in the theatrical performance expired. 'Oh,' said one old gentleman, 'he does that to every party. This is the fourth time that Mosley has turned on his own party and damaged it.' The political discussion continued. Since I was an Austrian, people asked me about my country and I am glad to affirm that Chancellor Schober is highly esteemed, even by the Conservatives. 'A most able and distinguished man,' said the old gentleman who had characterized Mosley so sharply.

Thursday evening the tension was at its height, but by Saturday the crisis had passed, the *Times* having run an editorial in which it stated that the Labor Government should be maintained in power. My week-end in Downing Street thus began quite pleasantly. Tea was served in Mr. Snowden's study, and the three of us dined together. He is lively, polite, and a quiet smile brightens up his face, though it seldom plays about his mouth. 'You must sit in this armchair by my writing desk, it is the warmest corner. And now I shall tell you about the triumphs of a Yorkshire girl. Amy Johnson has just landed in Australia. Courage is a wonderful virtue. And what did you do yesterday while we were in Oxford?'

I told him that a famous publisher, Mr. Gollancz, had given a luncheon for me in the Savoy; that Rose Macaulay, the renowned British novelist; Curtis Brown, an important literary agent; and Mrs. Garvin, the wife of the editor of the *Observer*, were all there. I also said that I had learned more in one hour about modern English literature than if I had read a hundred books. To my astonishment I discovered that Snowden knew almost everything about the latest books and he said that a new book called *War Is War* was the truest and most impressive of all war books. 'It is a complete, authentic story of a simple soldier who conceals nothing and distorts nothing.' We then discussed dramatic productions and when I described a comedy that I had seen called *Almost a Honeymoon* Snowden laughed and exclaimed, 'Oh, yes, that piece with the crazy second act.' Snowden has no time to go to the theatre, but he reads the dramatic criticisms and remembers everything.

Over the fireplace hung a framed picture. 'A caricature of me when I returned from the Hague. You must look at it carefully.' And at this point Snowden began to describe the weeks that he had spent at the

Hague. One of his pleasantest recollections was that of meeting Chancellor Schober. 'What a hard time he had there! I got to know him well. An able and extraordinary man, with energy, repose, and, what is best of all, humor. That quality is valuable even at the most tragic moments and is especially useful to the politician and statesman. We often noticed that trait in your Chancellor during the great struggles he had to put up at the Hague.'

When I left the wonderfully hospitable country of England I knew that Austria has awakened extraordinary sympathy in both Conservatives and Laborites, and I believe that there was a significance in the King's gesture when he chose an Austrian play as the first work in German to attend since the end of the War.

One of Bernard Shaw's most persistent and friendly adversaries takes his last play as a text for a witty sermon on our times. The essay might well have been entitled, '*The Apple Cart*—Upset.'

Keeping up with Mr. Shaw

By G. K. CHESTERTON

From the *Week-end Review*
London Conservative Weekly

AS ONE WHO HAS HAD the honor of conducting a continuous controversy with Mr. Bernard Shaw about everything in earth or heaven, ever since the time of the Boer War, I should like to be allowed to tell him that I think I did see the point of the admirable play called *The Apple Cart*—or rather, several points most of the critics have strangely failed to see. I should also like to say that, allowing for the very comparative truth in all such comparisons, I think *The Apple Cart* about the best play he ever wrote.

To take the most trivial matter first, the veteran dramatist is the only dramatist who seems to have any notion of what is really happening in the world to-day. He has really heard the news of the day; which is much too new to appear in the newspapers. That is why he was accused of senility and fossilized reaction by Mr. Hannen Swaffer, whose onward march of progress seems to have stopped somewhere about the time of the execution of Charles the First. Mr. Swaffer evidently does not know that monarchy is now the mood of the hour everywhere, whether rightly or wrongly; and that popular government is actually less popular than it deserves. I should have every sympathy with Mr. Swaffer if he stood up as a Democrat with the outlook of a Diehard. I have never been able to understand why this last nickname is always used as a sneer, when it seems rather too heroic a compliment. If an old radical like myself refused to support those who would die in the last ditch for the mere privilege of landlords or capitalists, it was because of what he thought about the dirtiness of the ditch, not about the doggedness of the dying. And if any other old radical would own himself old, and even old-fashioned, and die in the radical ditch waving a ragged old red flag, I should feel the warmest regard for him; I am not sure that I should not subside into the ditch beside him. But when he has the impudence to accuse a great man of over seventy of being blind with age because the older man can still see to read the proclamations of Mussolini, while the younger is still reading the earlier works of Mazzini, I think it is only fair to insist that it is obviously the younger man who is dated and the older who is up-to-date.

I SAY this is the most trivial aspect; and I am well aware that it has already worked to the disadvantage of Bernard Shaw's plays, which sometimes seem dated because they were so much up-to-date. A play like *The Philanderer* contains admirable dialogue; but the atmosphere of the Ibsen Club seems stale, precisely because the boast is not so much that Ibsen is a great topic as that Ibsen is a new topic. In that sense it is always a weakness to boast of being abreast of the times, like Mr. Shaw; but it is worse weakness to boast of being abreast of the times when you are actually behind the times, like Mr. Swaffer. The weakness is in the boasting, and in being primarily concerned about times at all. If Mr. Shaw lives for three hundred years, after the order of Methuselah (as I hope he will), the play of *The Apple Cart* may be as much behind the times as the play of *The Philanderer*. But *Everyman* and *Samson Agonistes* will not be behind the times, but rather beyond time. Anyhow, *The Apple Cart* is not behind the times now, as are nearly all its critics. And there are several examples of this even more amusing, I think, than the case of the modern reaction to monarchy.

Thus Mr. Shaw mentions one point which I particularly noticed and enjoyed; though many critics, it seems, never noticed it at all. I mean the fact that the Prime Minister's rages, which are so ridiculous considered as rages, are perfectly intelligent and calculated considered as tricks. That is a vital fact of modern government; and nobody has noted it in a play before. The new cunning consists not in hiding the emotions, but in showing the sham emotions. Familiarity is the instrument of falsity; we are no longer deceived by distance or disguise or mystery, but stifled in an embrace and swindled in a heart-to-heart talk. We used to complain that rulers were revered as if they were more than human. Our complaint may have been right, but we had not foreseen the filthy and ghastly results of being ruled by those who claim to be human, all too human. We rebelled, and perhaps rightly, when a king was made stiff with gold and gems like an idol, and set on a throne as if it were an altar. We are often tempted to-day to wish that the new ruler had the good manners of a stone image. We wish he were as well-behaved as a wooden idol or even a wooden-headed king. The king in Mr. Shaw's play is far from wooden-headed; but part of our sympathy with him comes from the vivid vulgarity of the other method, as used by Proteus, who will stoop to pretend weakness in order to preserve power. Politics have never been so frank or so false; we have never before heard so much about the politician's pet dog and so little about his party fund. Thus the monopolist newspapers, all ruled strictly and secretly by the caprice of one or two millionaires, appear to the public eye as one vast sea of slush and sob-stuff, of people weeping over what they never suffered or confessing what they never did. Emotional expediency, the method of Mr. Proteus, is now familiar to many people, but not to many dramatists or dramatic critics.

BUT my real reason for submitting this comment on Mr. Shaw's communication is concerned with a third example, in which he is especially abreast of the crisis and ahead of the critics. Hardly anybody has really understood the point about 'Breakages, Ltd.,' because nearly everybody is about six stages behind in the actual development of individualism into industrialism. Mr. Shaw is exactly on the very last lap or turn of intelligent criticism. First, of course, there was the time when capitalism boasted of competition, and dreaded a trust as much as a trade union. The hard-headed Manchester man of this period still lingers on the stage, along with the comic curate and the French maid. Then came the time when capitalism crushed competition; for it was capitalism, and not Socialism, that crushed it. Those who had denounced trusts were told to defend trusts; and they did so, hurriedly explaining that monopoly is the same as efficiency, that amalgamation is the fashion and

must be followed, and that the individual trader is a relic of the past. So we let ourselves be completely conquered by trusts; an appropriate title, for it was a touching manifestation of trust.

When trusts were finally established, they began, for the first time, to be seriously considered. And then the fun began. It is as yet only fun for a few; but among the few are Mr. Shaw and, if I may say so, myself. To some of us at least it is more and more obvious that there is not a word of truth in the eulogy on the capitalist trust, even in the muddy, materialistic eulogy that its flatterers give it. It has not only destroyed the virtues it despises, such as independence, individuality, and liberty, it has also destroyed the very virtues that it claims—efficiency and modernity and practical progress. Big business is not businesslike, it is not enterprising, it is not favorable to science and invention. By the very nature of its monopoly of machinery and mass production it works entirely the other way. Millions are sunk in plants that cannot be changed or brought up to date. Machinery is made so that it must be used, even when it is useless. Things are made badly so that they must be mended. Things are even made badly so that they may be mended badly, and, therefore, mended again. Under the beneficent influence of the merger, we are actually ruled by inefficiency; not by individual or accidental inefficiency, but by sustained and systematic inefficiency; by the principle of inefficiency; by the sacred rule and religion of inefficiency. In other words, as the dramatist notes, we are ruled by Breakages, Ltd.

Lastly, few seem to have realized that the play is a tragedy, that it does not turn on the comedy of the conversation between the American ambassador and the King, but on the tragedy of the absence of any conversation between the American ambassador and the Cabinet. Compared with the Cabinet squabbles, the visit of the American ambassador to the English court is like the visit of a vast comet to the earth. And it is implied that the Cabinet is quite capable of continuing to squabble, even if a comet did visit the earth. Those who worship the colossal, whether in comets or commerce, might possibly even rejoice that England was merged in America, or rejoice (for all I know) that the earth was merged in the senseless star dust of a larger luminary. But men of imagination never worship the colossal. King Magnus is made a man of imagination; he is made a subtle and attractive personality; he is made sympathetic, in fact, for the very simple reason that he is the hero of a tragedy. There is exactly the same type of attractiveness deliberately attributed to Hamlet or to Othello. For great tragedy is only great when it describes loss so as to increase value, and not to decrease it.

LETTERS AND THE ARTS

BARRIE AT SEVENTY

PRESIDING over a dinner given on his seventieth birthday for the benefit of the Royal Literary Fund, Sir James Barrie made a characteristic speech devoted to four of God's most important creations: women, children, fairies, and himself. Unlike most imaginative writers, the author of *Peter Pan* does not have to contend with the problem of creating and controlling characters, for they have the cutest way of leaping spontaneously into being, refusing to submit to his wishes and even—hey, presto—popping right into his after-dinner speeches:—

'The characters we think we create—that must be the most comic word in an author's vocabulary. Heroines are the worst—patient and pleasant until they get into your books, and then you are a lucky author if you know them by sight a week after. You may have taken the greatest care and pains with a woman and then you find her being quite civil to her father. It is so dampening. You want her to be a real woman.

'In my notebooks all my women are real women so long as they are just in the notebooks—tremendously determined to tell everything about themselves, to inquire into themselves, to cut themselves open. It would scarify you if you knew the things I intended my heroines to say. But they utterly turn away from me and remain that ghastly word, respectable.'

The labors of the creative mind need no longer mystify us, for we now possess this precious confession from Sir James himself, describing how he returned to the same Bloomsbury lodgings where his earlier masterpieces came into being:—

'I found even my old table there and the hole my foot had made in the mat. There I sat down in the old, joyous way to fight it out again with the stars. I think the days and nights that followed were

about the happiest in my life, unless I except the days and nights I had spent long ago in the same place. You know what the feeling is. The little room as night advances gets smaller and more kindly. The inkpot hopes to goodness it won't give out, the candle and the lamp come closer to serve your poor eyes. All of them are on your side, peeping, whispering. You have done it this time. Listen to the nightingale. They are ready to drop, next morning, a lodging-house tear when it turns out to be only a sparrow.

'My subject, you cannot think how sordid it was. The best of all stories used to end in dots, not merely dots here and there but a whole row at the end. They never will let me have dots. And then one night—I don't know if I can go on with this—I heard a female voice, a cooing voice, and then I saw her, and I said, with a sinking, "Who are you?" and she replied, "I am our seventieth mistake." I think she was a little sorry for me, for she said, "It is no use your trying to get rid of me, for I am inside you." I clutched my manuscript and cried, "At any rate it is going to end with dots," and she said, "Yes, darling, dots."'

Which, we reflected, was about enough Barrie for one issue. But seventy is a garrulous age and no sooner had Sir James made this speech than he hied him back to receive the freedom of his native town of Kirriemuir and to make another oration, this time in praise of a cricket pavilion that he was helping to dedicate. He spoke with real feeling—not with trumped-up literary emotionalism—about his youthful memories and described a walk that he took two years ago with a boyhood friend, James Robb:—

'I want to tell you about a very happy affair that is closely connected with this pavilion. Robb and I used to play together "till mysterious night fell," and then the one would accompany the other

half way home. After we parted we whistled to each other to intimate that no doolie had got us so far. It was a note we had invented—no one could whistle it except ourselves. Distance and the rugged things of life separated us as the years rolled on; we seldom met again for nigh half a century. We had sworn eternal friendship, but the rope seemed to have snapped. Then, two years ago, I was here on a sad errand, and the two of us went wandering away across the hill through Caddam.

"If I were to build a pavilion for myself it would be there. Well, that day in Caddam I made a grand discovery—that the great friend of my childhood was still the one who was closest to me in my doings. I can't tell you what a pleasure and satisfaction that has been to me. During our walk in the wood Mr. Robb said to me, gruffly, in case we got sentimental, you know:—

"We used to have a private way of whistling to each other."

"Did we?" I said, growling for the same reason. We were both so thrawn, you understand, that we should have flichtered a Southerner. "I could do it now," he said. "Oh?" I said. "I suppose you have forgotten it?" said he. "It was a long time ago," I said.

"Just so," said he. But I could see by his face that he wished I had remembered. I couldn't keep it up any longer, so I joukit behind a tree and whistled our whistle. He jumped and whistled it back. All through Caddam Wood we went, gaily whistling that old whistle; and, on my word, ladies and gentlemen, I think that is largely how it comes about that I offer you this pavilion."

LAST WORDS ON MAYERLING

THE QUESTION as to whether Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria and Marie Vetsera were assassinated or died in a suicide pact refuses to subside. Two French journalists, Claude Anet and A. t'Serstevens, have set forth the two conflicting theses in the form of fiction and

the various reports that we have printed in *THE LIVING AGE* led us to believe that M. Anet had spoken the last word and that the suicide theory had the backing of all the most reliable authorities. But M. t'Serstevens has brought forth an impressive retort and three more documents which he sums up as follows:—

'1. The dispatch of Pope Leo XIII to the Archbishop of Vienna shortly after Rudolph's death. This dispatch was published during the lifetime of the Pope and was never denied by the Vatican. In it the Pope authorizes the Archbishop to celebrate religiously the funeral of the Archduke, "because we know, in a way that cannot be doubted or discussed, that the late illustrious man was foully assassinated and that he did not commit suicide."

'2. The interview of Count Nigra, one of Rudolph's friends and the second man to enter the room with Loschek—the other being Count Hoyos. His declaration appeared in the *Corriere della Sera* during July, 1907. He described the room and the wound just as I described them in my book and ended with this absolutely forthright statement: "A suicide? Come now. It was an assassination. I can affirm it."

'3. The letter published by Jules Ra-teau in 1896, seven years after the tragedy, while the man to whom it was written and its author were still alive. It was written by Leopold II, king of Belgium and father-in-law of Rudolph, to his brother the Count of Flanders, father of the present king of Belgium, Albert I, just after Leopold II had arrived in Vienna shortly after the tragedy. This letter, published twice, once in 1896 and once in 1916 by M. Marguillier, who has done more than any other man to clear up the mystery of Mayerling, has never been denied by anybody. Here is the passage that interests us:—

"It is a matter of sovereign importance that the version of the suicide be affirmed and maintained. It may seem difficult for our Catholic populations to witness a house with the religious senti-

ments of the Hapsburgs affirming the version of suicide, but suicide and madness were the only ways of avoiding an unforgettable scandal the details of which I cannot confide in my letter but which I shall relate to you in full detail."

"These documents did not have to wait until 1923 to appear nor until all the interested parties were dead and buried. They did not emanate from the court at Vienna, from the Empress or from Frau Schrott, both of whom had every reason to avoid an unforgettable scandal, but from people foreign to that court who with high religious and royal consciences could not lend their support to the thesis of suicide."

Yet in spite of this display, those who believe in the suicide hypothesis again have the last word. *Comœdia*, in which the allegations of t'Serstevens appeared, has turned to Henri de Noussanne, a friend of royalty, who visited Mayerling, the scene of the tragedy, in 1921 with Princess Louise of Belgium, Rudolph's sister-in-law and one of those who saw the bodies of the two dead lovers the morning after they were killed. In her reminiscences, *Autour des Trônes que j'ai vu tomber*, she quotes Rudolph as having repeatedly asserted that he would never reign and throws light on his difficulties with Francis Joseph and the Papacy. The day before his death, Rudolph had been summoned by his father, who confronted the young man with a papal nuncio and rebuked him for having written to the Pope asking that his marriage with the Princess Stéphanie be annulled. The Emperor flew into a rage and the son rushed away, although ordered by his father to go to his apartments. In this state of mind he naturally resorted to suicide, as Marie Vetsera had long been insisting on making their relations public. 'Rudolph died of disgust,' says Princess Louise and M. de Noussanne asserts that her testimony can be believed since she holds no special brief for the Hapsburgs. But perhaps the most startling explanation of all comes from Mme. Marie Thérèse Vadala, who quotes the painter,

August Benziger, himself a friend of the Countess Vetsera, Marie's mother, as saying, 'If the archduke killed himself it was because he learned that he could not marry Marie Vetsera since she was born of a liaison between the Countess Vetsera and his own father Francis Joseph and was therefore his sister.'

JANNINGS' FIRST TALKIE

BEFORE returning to the stage after six years in the films, Emil Jannings acted in the first talkie to be made in Germany, *Der Blaue Engel*, an adaptation of Heinrich Mann's novel, *Professor Unrat*. The story deals with a small-town professor in middle life who falls in love with a variety actress, marries her, leaves his job, and becomes the clown, both off stage and on, of his wife's troupe. After many unhappy travels he finds himself about to open an engagement in the place where he used to teach. At this point he breaks down under the strain, deserts the company, and stumbles by night through a snowstorm to his former class room, where he dies while his wife continues an affair she had already entered upon with an acrobat. This is by no means the first time that Jannings has portrayed a befuddled old man who weakly gives himself over to love, but he has apparently never performed more effectively. Josef von Sternberg, né Joe Sternberg of New York City, directed the picture and special music was written by Friedrich Holländer, a German composer. A reviewer on the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, in which Jannings' farewell to the films that was translated in a previous issue also appeared, says that the *Blaue Engel* is no more sentimental than life itself and he uses the American term, 'sex appeal,' to describe the work of Marlene Dietrich, who plays the part of the variety star. The theme song is not 'Blaue Engel, I Love You,' but 'Ich bin von Kopf bis Fuss nur auf Liebe eingestellt,' which, freely translated, means 'From Head to Foot I'm Made for Nothing but Love.' One gathers that the Americanization of Germany proceeds apace.

AS OTHERS SEE US

BRIAND AND AMERICA

WILHELM SCHULZE, the New York correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung*, has sent his paper a bitter dispatch describing the attitude of most Americans toward Briand's plan for a United States of Europe. Incidentally, it is a sign of the times that Briand is now finding more enthusiastic support in Germany than in his own country.

Each year, for the past three or four years, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi has been devoting weeks of activity to writing and speaking to an elect American public in behalf of his Pan-Europa movement. One might, therefore, have imagined that Briand's memorandum would strike fertile soil in America and that it would not be hard to awaken considerable sentiment favorable to a united Europe. But in point of fact few Americans really favor this movement, and circumstances to-day are even less propitious than they were when Coudenhove-Kalergi made his first visit. America is not only more tired of Europe than she was in 1926 or 1927, America has not only advocated new ideas of her own on world brotherhood and peace since that time, she has also undergone an economic crisis and the struggle for existence which used to be a simple affair has now become a matter of primary political concern. The number of supporters that Count Coudenhove-Kalergi rallied around him on his second visit diminished and those that still remain faithful enjoy a dwindling prestige.

Opposed to the advocates of a United States of Europe stands the mass of the American people, who pay lip service to the idea of a federated Europe but who secretly ridicule the notion and look upon Briand as an impractical idealist. The United States of Europe is also opposed by an enormous number of people who

know nothing whatever about Europe and who do not care at all what happens in that part of the world. But the most determined enemies of Pan-Europa belong to that element known as the '100 per centers,' who conceal behind their loud patriotic pronouncements an ignorant terror of Europe.

The most violent reaction to Briand's memorandum has been occurring in their ranks. With a view to taking the wind out of their sails Briand informed the Department of State that the European alliance did not represent an attack on the United States of America. This action of his was well intentioned but futile. The inferiority complex from which these 100 per cent Americans suffer prevents them from accepting any assurances of this nature. They cannot look upon Pan-Europa as anything but an aggressive, expansive reality and no words can sway them from this belief.

Naturally, there are reasons for this sudden interest of theirs in Europe. Their patriotism has nothing idealistic about it. What they are really concerned about is the immigration law, the debt settlements, and the new tariff. Their patriotism is dictated by their bank accounts and their opinions of Pan-Europa are determined by their check books. For weeks and months past they had to listen to protests both from Americans and foreigners and it is no wonder that when the tariff is mentioned they at once think of robbery and extortion. Their bad consciences have made them feel that Pan-Europa threatens them with danger. Taking the standpoint that the best defense is an attack, they are already prophesying American exclusion from European markets. Time was when they took pleasure in calling attention to European rivalries, and to the absurd European frontiers as sources of danger to world peace, and they took the likelihood of a European

war as an excuse for maintaining an attitude of political isolation from the Old World. But now that the first practical step has been taken to eliminate these dangers and to establish the peace of Europe on firm foundations they are playing another tune. Their minds can not conceive of power being directed toward anything but aggressive purposes and the logical object of this aggression must in their opinion be America.

If this group has not yet begun attacking the Pan-European movement openly there is unfortunately a good reason for their forbearance. The 100 per centers reckon on England and they are convinced that England will not coöperate with Europe and that the plan for a united continent will thus be defeated. If they are mistaken we must not be surprised if the same group that used to advocate the strictest kind of abstinence from European entanglements suddenly discovers a sympathy for England and proceeds to explode a few mines in the hated field of European diplomacy to recall to this England her Anglo-Saxon destiny. It would be stupid for Europeans to conceal from themselves the fact that any of their attempts at coöperation will be opposed most bitterly by this group of Americans.

AMERICA'S SLUMP THROUGH COMMUNIST EYES

MARCELCACHIN, Communist member of the Chamber of Deputies, has written a strong leading editorial for *L'Humanité*, his party's official journal, interpreting the collapse on the New York Stock Exchange that immediately followed Mr. Hoover's latest manifesto to the effect that prosperity had returned.

Here are some particularly choice paragraphs:—

At the time of the first October crash the magnates, politicians, and economists in the United States tried to give the impression that the financial crisis that shook the New York Stock Exchange would produce only indirect and limited results on the economic condition of the Dollar Republic. This was a tremendous bluff. We are living in the epoch of finance capitalism and there are the closest connections between the big stock exchanges and the powerful centralized industries. We see on the one hand an anarchy of overproduction of merchandise and on the other a general underconsumption which underlies the great distress of the present time and the still greater distress to come.

The result of these chronic relapses is bound to take the form of more unemployment in the capitalist countries. The economic crisis is going to become more widespread and will first come to a head in the United States, where immense confusion prevails. We read in the American press of the stupefied outbursts of capitalists who witnessed the enormous parades of the unemployed on the 6th of March. Of course, Communism has been blamed and Foster and other valiant fighters of our brother Communist Party overseas have been imprisoned, although it is not long ago that the Communists were made sport of and the very existence of their party was virtually denied. The incarceration of our friends, however, will not prevent, indeed it will hasten, the very rapid radicalization of the masses of the unemployed and of all other workers.

CORRESPONDENCE

FROM THE Honorable Frank L. Polk, former Counselor to the State Department and Under Secretary of State and head of the American delegation to the Peace Conference at Paris, 1919, has come a much appreciated letter:—

15 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK CITY

TO THE EDITOR:—

I have been reading *THE LIVING AGE* with a great deal of interest and I find in every number several articles on topics on which I needed information. There is no question about it but the American people are far too interested in domestic affairs to realize the importance of foreign problems which really affect the interests of this country. Anything that you can do to make them look out once in a while instead of looking in is more than worth while.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

FRANK L. POLK

Three university presidents have recently expressed warm approval of the plans and policies of *THE LIVING AGE*.

That Arnold Bennett Hall, President of the University of Oregon, finds more of interest and profit in the pages of *THE LIVING AGE* than in any other magazine published to-day, is indeed high praise, for which the Editors make grateful acknowledgment. President Hall writes:—

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON
EUGENE, OREGON

TO THE EDITOR:—

I wish to express my hearty approval of your policy of publishing selected articles from the foreign press. I think I receive more profit and find more interest in reading these articles in *THE LIVING AGE* than I do from the articles in any one other magazine that comes to my desk. You are rendering to me, at least, an invaluable service in enabling me in an easy and convenient way to keep in touch with the thought of the publicists of

other nations. I hope you are able to continue along the lines thus so wisely established.

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

Frank L. McVey, President of the University of Kentucky, discerning that this periodical occupies a unique field, with 'a distinct work to do,' speaks words of commendation which are valued not only for the cordial spirit they breathe but also for the clear definition they give of our fundamental aims:—

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY

TO THE EDITOR:—

I have enjoyed *THE LIVING AGE* very much since it has changed its policy and returned to the old viewpoint. It makes a very definite contribution in bringing American readers some knowledge and understanding of what is being thought abroad. Like no other publication *THE LIVING AGE* has a distinct work to do and I am glad it is undertaking it and I trust that it will be able to continue with increasing favor.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANK L. McVEY

President of the University

From Urbana, Illinois, where, by the way, Stuart Sherman taught for so many years, President David Kinley writes a letter in which he dwells particularly on the importance of the improved international understandings which *THE LIVING AGE* is laboring to promote:—

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA, ILLINOIS

TO THE EDITOR:—

It seems to me that your plan is an excellent one. People must know one another's difficulties, problems, and points of view before there can be any proper basis for sympathy with one another. The better acquainted people are with one another the less likely are they to quarrel; even when they find that they cannot agree on some matters

they are more likely to agree to disagree, if they know one another well.

Your policy is a good one. It will take time to bring results but I believe that the results will come.

Very truly yours,
DAVID KINLEY, *President*

From a well known New York author and publisher, Mr. Joseph Sears, comes a happy and useful suggestion. Mr. Sears writes:—

40 WEST 57TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

TO THE EDITOR:—

I might suggest that I think you would increase your circulation if you would make THE LIVING AGE more personal. The American people, unquestionably, like personality. Perhaps I can best illustrate the idea by saying that a history of the United States which traced our growth through the biographies of its leaders would be more interesting than one which merely chronicled events—Trevelyan's *History of the American Revolution* is more salable than that part of Schouler's *History of the United States* which deals with the Revolution.

Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH HAMBLÉN SEARS

Upton Sinclair, author of numberless tracts, pamphlets, and novels, finds time to write us a highly characteristic letter in which his approval of our general policy is, quite naturally, qualified by his sympathy with the 'underdog.'

PASADENA, CALIFORNIA

TO THE EDITOR:—

I think your custom of reprinting worth while European material for American readers is an excellent one. If I had any fault to find with your carrying out of the programme, it would be this: I sometimes think that you give an excess of the official or ruling-class point of view. There are many publications which give us this, and make one think of a 'court circular.' As you doubtless know, I think that the really vital movements in Europe are those of popular protest, and those who speak for this movement are the voices that are most important for Americans to hear and understand. Otherwise, it will

happen that when the next great upheaval comes in Europe, we won't understand it any better than we did the Russian Revolution, and will be a prey to the same professional liars who caused us to waste our energies and our idealism from 1917 until the present moment.

Sincerely,
UPTON SINCLAIR

It is, of course, our hope that the spread of better world understandings to which THE LIVING AGE is dedicated will help to prevent that 'next great upheaval' to which Mr. Sinclair refers.

Mr. Charles Vezin of Old Lyme considers THE LIVING AGE the one magazine which, above all others, he would select if limited to a single periodical. This is indeed gratifying. We quote Mr. Vezin:—

OLD LYME, CONNECTICUT

TO THE EDITOR:—

I subscribe to six or eight magazines and sporadically buy others. If I had to confine myself to *one* it would be THE LIVING AGE as now published.

Truly yours,
CHARLES VEZIN

It is a satisfaction that the world-wide point of view which the Editors seek to express or reflect in these pages continues to inspire our readers to write us their frank opinions of international affairs.

The recent tariff legislation by the United States Congress is a case in point. We have received an outspoken criticism of the tendencies of this legislation from Burgess W. Wooley, the President of the Argentine-American Chamber of Commerce and an important official of the Vitaphone Corporation. Mr. Wooley raises so many of the same objections that we have noted in the foreign press that our readers will be interested by a comparison of Mr. Wooley's views with those expressed elsewhere in this issue by several distinguished foreign editors. Mr. Wooley writes:—

321 WEST 44TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

THE GUIDE POST

(Continued)

TO THE EDITOR:—

To those of us who have had an opportunity to travel beyond the immediate confines of this republic, the apathy displayed by our own public toward international trade and social relationships has become an increasing source of serious concern during the past few years. Such a lack of understanding of our own needs in relation to the world situation, involving as it does our actual position in world affairs, has seemed to be almost incredible at times. I have come to the conclusion, however, that nothing short of dire necessity can possibly kindle the spark of true patriotic interest which represents the spirit of your publication.

In other words, as long as artificial make-shifts, such as the tariff bolstered by fallacious arguments and such as our unequaled standard of living to maintain the show of prosperity, persuade us to remain as Americans in a state of apathy toward our true aims and destiny, just so long will it be impossible to encourage foreign trade and cultural relationships with even a modicum of success.

It is doubtful if England would have become as speedily the great free trade and international empire that she is to-day were it not for the fact that she was forced to deal with the world beyond her doors for the sake of obtaining her own bare necessities. That America is fast reaching such a period in her growth I think is evinced by the reaction against the passage of the highest tariff bill in history, by the growing interest and sympathy indicated by individual Americans toward their foreign friends, and by the increasing tolerance and interest displayed in the interchange of ideas between this country and her neighbors.

The service that *THE LIVING AGE* almost alone is rendering the country in pointing the road of true patriotism will prove invaluable and its work as pioneer at the dawn of a new era of American international policy and commercial expansion should become a matter of historic significance.

Very truly yours,
BURGESS W. WOOLEY

For the very friendly sentiments contained in the final paragraph of Mr. Wooley's letter, the Editors express warm appreciation.

mantle of Socialism over what was before the War the most brilliant imperial city in Europe, should have been chiefly—and apparently favorably—impressed by the scintillant pageantry of the London Socialist scene.

IN MOSCOW STRETCHES EAST will be found an authentic picture, painted in not too brilliant colors, of workaday conditions in Soviet Russia. **HERR STEIN'S** contribution to the article, **RUSSIA'S NEW RAILWAY**, gives something more than that, as well; something usually neglected by foreign journalists: an idea of what the Russians hope to do with their own country by dint of long and patient labor, aided by proper transportation facilities. It should make clear that not quite all the energy of the Communists goes to plotting and inveighing against the wicked capitalist world.

M. LOUIS GUILAINE, writing in *Le Temps*, semi-official organ of the French government, does not feel that the proponents of a United States of Europe should be in the least discouraged by what he is pleased to call the 'failure' of the Pan-American idea. Whether the arguments which support his annihilation of the Pan-American Union's smallest claims to virtue are sound or not (and his statement that the United States restricts immigration from South America by quota certainly is not) makes little difference. He writes from a point of view not often encountered by Americans; and it is because we are frequently able to present such unusual viewpoints that a distinguished educator, whose letter appears elsewhere in this issue, says that 'like no other publication *THE LIVING AGE* has a distinct work to do.' Nearly everyone will admit that the Pan-American Union has not accomplished all that it might for the organization of peace and security in this hemisphere.

WAR AND PEACE

Our relations with foreign nations are not very different from our relations with each other in family, church, or state. They must be based on understanding. . . . If we can live in our respective homes loyal to our cities, states, and nations, yet ready to attribute to other men an honest purpose, it is more important than the most solemn treaties we may sign on parchment.—*Dwight W. Morrow, United States Ambassador to Mexico.*

You of the United States will have an ever increasing responsibility—not to send troops, or to show your might, but to exercise your great influence for good and for peace. Even now you have but to raise your right hand at the threat of war to save millions in money and many lives. Soon the lifting of your little finger will prevent wars.—*The Earl of Derby.*

We now know that it is no longer safe to allow a country to engage in aggressive war. The Great War profited no one; it injured everybody. The forces of destruction which have been developed show that civilization could probably not survive another great war.—*Ivy Lee, of New York, in Commencement Address at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee.*

'The best safeguard for peace is adequate armament' is an old saying perhaps occasionally believed in even by pacifists. Such an idea has long swayed the thoughts of the peoples of the world. But the existence of powerful armaments in one country gives rise to suspicion, fear, and animosity in other countries, which will naturally increase their armaments in turn. There will then ensue a rivalry among the nations which will exacerbate their relations and more often than not lead to war. Thus swollen armaments, instead of bringing peace to the nations, will weaken their security and will prove the source of all manner of misfortune to them. That is the one great lesson which the World War gave to humanity.—*Baron Shidehara, Japanese Foreign Minister.*

I fear we do not appreciate the seriousness of the feeling of irritation against the United States throughout Europe. There is a popular superstition that we are attempting an attitude of dictation, while we are assuming a position of isolation—building high tariff barriers against the interchange of commodities.—*Adolph S. Ochs, publisher of the 'New York Times,' upon his recent return from a two months' European trip.*